為何廢棄混合式選舉制度？－義大利、俄羅斯與泰國選制改革之研究

Why Was the Mixed-Member Electoral System Abandoned?-The Case Study of Italy, Russia, and Thailand

蘇子喬(Tzu-Chiao Su) ； 王業立(Yeh-Lih Wang)

《東吳政治學報》 28卷3期 (2010/09) Pp. 1-81

https://doi.org/10.6418/SJPS.201009.0001

摘要

在二十世紀末，許多新興民主國家與先進民主國家在選舉制度的選擇上，紛紛選擇了混合式選舉制度，儼然形成一波採行混合式選舉制度的浪潮。然而在晚近，採行混合制的義大利、俄羅斯與泰國，卻又不約而同廢棄了混合制，改採其他的選舉制度。本文乃以新制度論的研究途徑，探討這三個國家選舉制度發生變遷的成因，藉此對當前混合式選舉制度看似「退潮」的跡象進行初探性的研究。
本文的主要發現有三，首先，義大利、俄羅斯與泰國三個國家廢棄混合制的主要因素各有不同：俄羅斯是基於普亭試圖持續壟斷權力的制度佈局；泰國是因為軍方力量的復辟；義大利則是肇因於小黨的要脅。其中，俄羅斯與泰國的選制變遷，都是在民主倒退的脈絡下發生；而義大利和泰國的選制變遷，皆回到該國最初始的選舉制度。其次，從三國過去採取混合制的經驗可以發現，混合制中單一選區相對多數制的施行，未必能夠塑造兩大黨為主的政黨體系，此一事實透露了杜瓦傑法則(Duverger's law)的侷限性。第三，這三個國家的選制變遷經驗也顯示，政治菁英追求權力極大化，不見得是單純地追求其所屬政黨的國會席次極大化，亦即「權力極大化」不完全等同「國會席次極大化」，菁英個人的利益也不完全等同於組織團體的利益。

關鍵字

選舉制度 ； 單一選區兩票制 ； 新制度論 ； 歷史制度論 ； 杜瓦傑法則

並列摘要

The mixed-member electoral system was riding high globally at the end of the 20(subscript th) century with many nascent and mature democracies such as Italy, Russia and Thailand, adopting it one after another. However, these three countries have abandoned the system recently and adopted another electoral system. This paper tries to explore, by the new-institutional approach, the factors of electoral system reform of these three countries, and do primary research on the seeming ebb of the mixed-member electoral system.
There are three major findings in this paper. Firstly, the main causes of the renouncement of mixed-member electoral system in these three countries are different. In Russia, it is based on Putin's attempt to continue his monopoly of power; in Thailand, it is due to the restoration of military power; while in Italy, it is caused by the small parties' blackmail. Furthermore, the electoral system transition in Russia and Thailand occurred while democracy was in recession, and the electoral system transition in Italy and Thailand was transited back into its original state.
Secondly, plurality with a single-member-district system in a mixed-member electoral system does not promise a two-party system. This is exemplified again from the experiences of these three country's electoral system reform, and it also disclosed the limitedness of Duverger's law.
Last but not least, the electoral system transition of these three countries also demonstrates that the purpose of the political elites' pursuit of power maximization is not simply to seek for the maximization of seats in the parliament for the party they belong to. That is, power maximization and seat maximization in the parliament are not entirely equal, neither are the elites' individual or the organizations' benefits.

並列關鍵字

electoral system ； mixed-member system ； new institutionalism ； historical institutionalism ； Duverger's law

參考文獻

(ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 2009. “Comparative Data.” in http://aceproject.org/epic-en. Latest update 8 November 2009.).http://aceproject.org/epic-en

Adam Carr's Election Archive. 2009. “Kingdom of Tailand.” in http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/t/thailand/. Latest update 8 November 2009.

Alexander, Jeffrey(1987).The Micro-Macro Link.Berkeley, CA:University of California Press.

Bardi, Luciano(2007).Electoral Change and Its Impact on the Party System in Italy.West European Politics.30(4),711-732.

Bartolini, Stefano(2002).The Political Consequences of the Italian Mixed Electoral System (1994-2001).Proceeding of a Conference on Elections and Democracy.(Proceeding of a Conference on Elections and Democracy).: