笛卡爾懷疑論論證的模態議題

Some Modal Problems in Descartes' Sceptical Arguments

侯維之(Richard Wei-Tzu Hou)

《歐美研究》 41卷1期 (2011/03) Pp. 281-307

https://doi.org/10.7015/JEAS.201103.0281

摘要

本文在第二、三節試圖以知態可能性來分析笛卡爾的惡魔論證，主張該論證的重點，在於無法區分我們是在知態惡魔世界或正常世界。第四節探討笛卡爾的知態可能性概念，強調以知態可能性分析笛卡爾的知識概念，再佐以現行分析知態可能性的理論，會形成新的笛卡爾循環。第五節則討論笛卡爾循環在知態模態上的問題，指出除非訴諸導致新笛卡爾循環的知態原則，原有的循環依然成立。第六節針對笛洛思的詮釋，探討其嘗試以外在論來解決笛卡爾循環的問題；並再次指出，除非訴諸新笛卡爾循環，這種作法註定失敗。

關鍵字

知態可能性 ； 惡魔論證 ； 脈絡原則 ； 笛卡爾循環

並列摘要

Unlike manyother sceptical arguments, little attention has been paid to Descartes' demon argument. This paper discusses how to analyse this argument via the notion of epistemic possibility, and claims that the momentum of the argument rests on our inability to determine whether we are in the epistemic demon world or in the normal world. It goes on to discuss a likely version of Descartes' epistemic possibilities, emphasizing that attempting to analyse Descartes' notion of epistemic possibility in terms of current theories creates a new Cartesian circularity. The epistemic modal problem of the old Cartesian circularity is discussed, and it is argued that the old circularity would linger unless the epistemic principle(s), on which the new circularity is based surplant it. The paper concludes with DeRose's interpretation of Descartes' sceptical arguments and of how the old circularity can be expelled. It will be shown that the problem of disposing of the Cartesian circularity in an externalist way. DeRose's strategy seems to function only because it makes an appeal to the new circularity.

並列關鍵字

epistemic possibility ； the demon argument ； contextualist principle ； the Cartesian circle

參考文獻

Adam, C.(ed.),Tannery, P.(ed.)(1964).Oeuvres de Descartes.Paris:L. Cerf.

DeRose, K.(1991).Epistemic possibilities.The Philosophical Review.100(4),581-605.

DeRose, K.(1992).Descartes, epistemic principles, circularity, and scientia.Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.73,220-238.

Descartes, R.(1990).Meditations on first philosophy.Notre Dame, UK:University of Notre Dame Press.

Egan, A.(2007).Epistemic modals, relativism, and assertion.Philosophical Studies.133(1),1-22.