詹姆士的實用主義「實在」觀

本文系統地詮釋了詹姆士《實用主義》第五、六、七講中有關「實在」的諸主張，整理出「觀念系統多元論」、「實在變動論」以及「人文主義『實在』觀」三大論點，統合命名為「詹姆士的實用主義『實在』觀」；本文並且指出，詹姆士是從知識論的角度，在他的「個人信念修改機制」與「三重實在」主張的架構下來詮釋與辯護這三個論點，而「三重實在」主張又建立在他的實用主義「實在」定義之上；本文最後考察了「對個人信念缺乏足夠的客觀約束」這個批評意見對於「個人信念修改機制」以及這三個論點所造成的衝擊。

關鍵字

詹姆士；實用主義；實在；人文主義；多元論

並列摘要

In this paper, it is shown that Lectures Five, Six, and Seven of William James's Pragmatism contain the following three interesting, but puzzling and often misunderstood, theses on reality: conceptual scheme pluralism, the thesis of the mutation of reality, and a humanist view of reality. Taken together, I consider these ”James's pragmatic notion of reality.” It is argued that James can be better interpreted as explaining and defending these three theses from an epistemological perspective, within a framework based on both his holistic model of belief revision and his notion of ”three-fold realities.” Finally, I investigate whether the objection that there are insufficient objective regulations on belief successfully challenges his model of belief revision and these three theses on reality.

並列關鍵字

William James ； pragmatism ； reality ； humanism ； pluralism

參考文獻

鄭喜恆(2009)。詹姆士論「真理」與「實在」的關係。東吳哲學學報。20，91-112。

Goodman, R. (2009). William James. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2009 edition). Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/james/