人工智慧是否「具有思想」？一個胡塞爾現象學式的分析

人工智慧技術日趨成熟，擬真的互動和智慧讓機器人與真人的差異越來越模糊。人工智慧究竟是否和人類一樣，「具有思想」？在這篇文章中，我將透過胡塞爾的現象學來論證，人工智慧「能思考」，並擁有系統性的知識；但還不「具有思想」。因為「具有思想」，需要一套知覺經驗的動機網絡作為必要條件。如此的知覺經驗具有肉身性，並且對世界和他人開放。人工智慧和人類智慧的差異不在於高層次的語言計算能力，而是在於意識更底層的根本作用。意識有其自身持續的內在建構，此建構既是不停地在變動，也是自主地持續朝往「成為」的過程。這也代表，真正「具有思想」，蘊含的是具有肉身的生命。

關鍵字

意識；知覺；認知；人工智慧；胡塞爾現象學

並列摘要

As the technology on which artificial intelligence is based becomes more sophisticated, animated human-like interactions and super-intelligent computer programs will blur the lines between AI and human intelligence. The question arises, do artificial intelligences really "have thoughts" like humans? In this article I will argue, based on Husserl's phenomenology, that artificial intelligence "can think," and that the system can indeed respond, but this does not mean that it really "has thoughts." Necessary conditions of "having thoughts" are perceptual experience and motivational relations. Such perceptual experiences are embodied and open to the intersubjective world. The difference between artificial intelligence and human intelligence does not lie in the higher level of linguistic capability, but in the more fundamental functions of consciousness. Consciousness has its own continuously immanent constitution, which is constantly in changing in processes of self-organization, and of "becoming." This means that to genuinely "have thoughts" is to have an embodied life.

並列關鍵字

consciousness ； perception ； cognition ； artificial intelligence ； Husserl's phenomenology

參考文獻

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