台灣管理階層薪資結構：Tournament Theory之實證研究

The Wage Payment Structure in Taiwan: An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory

單驥(Gee San) ； 吳玉瑩(Yu-Yin Wu)

《管理評論》 23卷2期 (2004/04) Pp. 45-68

https://doi.org/10.6656/MR.2004.23.2.CHI.45

摘要

薪資水準的決定就經濟理論而言一直是一個重要的研究課題，Lazear和Rosen於1981年提出了競賽理論(tournament theory)以說明廠商內不同職級別间薪資差距存在的原因。本研究除依競賽理論探討員工間彼此相互競爭如何影響其薪資差異外，亦另再引進廠商间彼此在業務上相互競爭之壓力此一因素，以探討台灣的相關事業單位其單位內的薪資差距是否仍符合競賽理論所預期：當員工之間彼此的競爭程度愈大時，其薪資間的差異水準也將愈大的理論。為此，本文乃將原來的競賽理論模型進一步擴充納入廠商間相互的競爭因素，之後，再以民國八十八年勞委會所作的「職類別薪資調查」的資料，依照員工不同的工作性質將員工分為事務人員、專業人員及技術人員三種類型，以探討台灣廠商其職級別薪資結構是否符合競賽理論所預期。實證結果證明，廠商的薪資結構大體而言符合競賽理論所預期，薪資的差距除的確受到員工間彼此競爭的影響外，也會受到廠商间彼此相互競爭的影響。本研究的實證結果顯示，員工彼此間的替代性愈大，及廠商所屬產業集中度愈高時，廠商內的薪資結構便愈如競賽理論之預期，職級間薪資差距將愈為拉大。

關鍵字

競賽理論 ； 薪資差距 ； 職類別薪資

並列摘要

The determination of the wage payment has long been an important research topic in economic theory. Lazear and Rosen (1981) proposed the use of Tournament Theory to explain why wages vary among different hierarchical positions within a firm. In this study, we not only test Tournament Theory, but we also introduce the competition mechanism which arises among different firms within an industry in order to examine whether a larger wage differential gap will still be observed as the competition within a hierarchical position becomes keener. To facilitate this study, we utilize ”Occupational Wage Survey” data collected by the Council of Labor Affairs in 1999 to test the Tournament Theory for clerical workers, professional workers and engineers. Our empirical results confirm that the existence of the wage differential is affected by both competition among workers in the same hierarchical position and competition among firms in the same industry. In addition, higher substitutability among workers as well as higher concentration ratios for a firm within an industry have a positive impact in terms of enlarging the wage payment gap among different hierarchical positions.

並列關鍵字

tournament theory ； wage differential ； occupational wage levels

參考文獻

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Lazear, E.,Rosen, S.(1981).Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.Journal of Political Economy.89,841-864.

Rosen, S.(1986).Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments.American Economic Review.76,701-715.