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The Impact of Incentive Compensation Structure on the Choice Strategy of Earnings Management

摘要


Purpose - The purpose of the paper is to explore whether the impact of an incentive compensation system is just the manipulation of financial statements or at the expense of real future benefits. Specifically, it studies whether the compensation structure mitigates the negative influences. Design/methodology/approach - By empirical study, the paper explore the influences of incentive compensation system on the use of accrual-based, classification shifting, and real earnings management. Findings - The results show that incentive compensation simultaneously increases the use of accrual-based, classification shifting, and real earnings management. And a stock-based compensation system decreases the use of real earnings management, but increases the use of classification shifting and accruals-based earnings management. Research limitations/implications - This study only considers 5 compensations including salaries, bonuses and extraordinary charges, stock dividends, cash dividends, and employee stock options. In addition, earnings management methods are limited to classification shifting, accruals-based, or real earnings management. Practical implications/Social implication - The incentive compensation harm the firm's real benefit, that could be mitigates by a stock-based compensation structure. Originality/value - A stock-based compensation structure could mitigate the negative influences of the incentive compensation system.

參考文獻


Abernathy, John L., Brooke Beyer, and Eric T. Rapley (2014), “Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting,” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 41(5-6), 600-626.
Alfred, Lye Chye Loh, Tan Tin Hoe, and Trevor Wilkins (2001), “The Role of the Discretionary Accruals and Classification Decisions in the Management of Earnings,” SSRN working paper, (April 30), (accessed December 17, 2019), [available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080778].
Altman, Edward (1968), “Financial Ratio, Discriminate Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy,” Journal of Finance, 23(4): 589-609.
Armstrong, Christopher S., Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker (2010), “Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities,” Journal of Accounting Research, 48(2), 225-271.
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