本文藉由台灣「國營企業民營化」的經驗,來探討國有企業中,特殊的代理人問題,與如何建立有效的「國企治理」體制。自2000年以來,台灣試圖藉由國營企業民營化,減少政府財稅負擔或增加國庫收入。然而,在追求這似乎名正言順的民營化過程中,若缺乏「治理文化」的養成與健全的「國企治理」體制配套,很可能造成利益輸送、或國產掏空情事。因國有企業存在目的的特殊、與「權」「利」糾葛的複雜,其可能產生利益輸送的成因與管道與民間企業不同,以至於從一般「公司治理」的角度,無法概括「國企治理」相關問題。本文從企業金融與法律的面向,檢視目前台灣官股具有絕對或實質影響力的國有企業內的治理問題,並提出建立有效「國企治理」體制的方案,以避免將國有資產不當掏空、浪費、或輸送於財團或個人。
We examine the asset tunneling where the authorities in Taiwan empower certain individuals or organizations to hold the reins of state-owned (or- influenced) enterprises (SOEs) without legitimate reasons. In the name of privatization, Taiwan government has been seeking to minimize its role in the economy by privatizing state enterprises since Year 2000. However, pursuing privatization without putting sound governance culture and system in place may not serve original intentions. This paper examines the governance system of several leading and influential SOEs in Taiwan from the perspective of both finance and law. We identify alleged "tunnels" where the transfer of state assets without monitoring mechanism is possible. Tunnelling examples are provided, structural remedies are suggested, and SOE governance is called upon academic attention.