董監自利行為與核心代理問題之關聯性

The Relationship between Director and Supervisor's Self-interest Behavior and Core Agency Problem

王元章(Yung-Jang Wang) ； 陳振傑(Zhen-Jie Chen)

《財務金融學刊》 19卷4期 (2011/12) Pp. 1-39

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2011.19(4).1

摘要

本研究遵循台灣證券交易所的定義挑選出董監自利公司並探討其董監自利行為與核心代理問題間的關係。實證結果發現董監持股比率愈低、信用評等愈差、控制股東現金流量請求權愈低、或控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈高之公司，其董監事的自利程度與自利行為發生之機率也會愈高。此外，若控制股東能完全控制公司時也會有較高的董監自利程度。外部董監席次比率愈低之公司，因為代理問題或監督機制的不完善，導致其董監自利行為之發生機率也會愈高。國內企業因具特殊的股權結構，易導致董監自利行為的發生，本研究結果將可協助釐清董監自利行為與核心代理問題之間的關係。

關鍵字

董監自利行為 ； 董事會結構 ； 股權結構 ； 核心代理問題

並列摘要

This study follows the definition of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation to select the director and supervisor's self-interest companies and investigate the relationship between the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors and the core agency problem. The results show that companies with higher degree and probability of self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors are usually characterized by the lower ownership of directors and supervisors, worse TCRI rankings, lower cash flow rights or greater separation between the control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. In addition, the companies fully controlled by the controlling shareholders also have a higher degree of self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. The companies with low outside directors and supervisors, due to core agency problem and weak corporate governance mechanism, are more likely to have self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. On account of the unique ownership structure of Taiwanese companies, it's not hard to observe the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors. The findings of this study may help us better understand the relationship between the self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors and core agency problem.

並列關鍵字

Self-interest behavior of directors and supervisors ； Board structure ； Ownership structure ； Core agency problem

參考文獻

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