本文探討董事及重要職員責任保險的需求因素,及其與自願性核閱是否影響盈餘保守性。實證結果發現公司訴訟風險較高者,董監事(directors and officers, D&O)責任險需求也較高。其次,D&O責任險之保額愈高時,愈容易產生較不保守的盈餘報告。再者,自願性核閱會影響盈餘保守性,且與D&O責任險的購買存在互補關係。
We show that firms with greater litigation risk are more likely to purchase directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance. The data do not support the hypothesis that D&O insurance complements the existing monitoring mechanism. Instead, we find strong evidence that the higher the D&O liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of directors and officers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. In addition, we find that firms that voluntarily choose to have a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) review tend to have fewer conservative earnings reports. Moreover, the demand for D&O insurance and the voluntary CPA review are complementary.