本研究的研究目的主要在探討台灣上市櫃公司投保董監事責任險(簡稱D&O責任險)對實質盈餘管理之影響。投保D&O責任險有其利弊,若管理階層存有管理機會主義時,將可能導致道德風險的危機,進而做出不利於投資者的決策行為,若以此動機從事盈餘管理,最大受害者即為投資大眾與股東。由於先前文獻對於盈餘管理之衡量變數主要以應計盈餘管理作為代理變數,但近期的研究大多指出管理階層漸漸改以實質交易安排取代裁決性應計項目的盈餘管理,故本研究將焦點著墨於實質盈餘管理,並以此作為盈餘管理之代理變數以進行研究。本研究的研究結果發現,相較於未投保D&O責任險的公司,投保D&O責任險的公司,愈會從事實質盈餘管理;此外,本研究亦發現,當D&O責任險投保的保額愈高時,公司愈會傾向於從事實質盈餘管理。
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between Directors’ and Officers’ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance and real earnings management for firms listed in Taiwan. There is an ongoing debate about the merits and costs of D&O insurance. One view is that it might induce managerial opportunism moral hazard problems and reduce incentives to act in the best interest of investors. The opportunistic incentives might motivate managers to devote to earning management and reduce incentives on behalf of investors and shareholders. Based on recent literature that provides evidence suggesting that managers prefer real earnings management activities compared to accrual-based earnings management, this study uses real earnings management activities to proxy for earnings management and investigates the effect of D&O liability insurance on earnings management. The empirical evidence shows that purchasers are more likely to engage in real earnings management than non-purchasers. Further, firms with more D&O liability insurance limits are more likely to devote to real earnings management.