本文以2008年至2010年台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱D&O保險)與管理階層盈餘管理行為之關聯性。實證結果發現,相對於未購買D&O保險的公司,有購買D&O保險的公司,管理階層益餘管理的幅度較大,而且進一步分析也發現,有購買D&O保險的公司,超額投保金額愈大,管理階層益餘管理的幅度是愈大。此外,本文實證結果亦發現,當管理階層操縱盈餘增加時,有購買D&O保險的公司,會讓管理階層有較大的空間;然而,當管理階層操縱益餘減少時,則未有穩鍵的證據支持購買D&O保險對管理階層盈餘管理的行為有明顯影響。
Using publicly-available D&O insurance data for public companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2010, this study examines the effects of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on earnings management behavior of managers. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals than those without D&O insurance. In addition, we also find that firms with higher abnormal D&O insurance coverage have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, we find that there exists a positive relationship between D&O insurance and discretionary accruals in firms managing earnings upward. However, we find no significant evidence on the above-mentioned relationship for firms managing earnings downward.