Mandatory Adoption of XBRL and Corporate Earnings Management: The Effect of Corporate Governance

強制採用XBRL與企業盈餘管理－公司治理之影響

賴秀卿(Syouching Lai) ； 李宏志(Hungchih Li)

《財務金融學刊》 29卷3期 (2021/09) Pp. 91-122

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.202109_29(3).0003

摘要

Using Taiwan listed and OTC companies as the sample, this paper studies how the requirement to adopt eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) affects corporate earnings management. Our findings show that mandatory XBRL adoption reduces earnings management. Regarding the effect of corporate governance, the negative association between mandatory XBRL adoption and earnings management becomes weaker if the major stockholders' shareholding is higher, and becomes stronger if the institutional investor shareholding is higher. The results support the Taiwan government's policy of requiring companies to use XBRL to report financial information.

關鍵字

XBRL ； earnings management ； corporate governance

並列摘要

本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討強制採用可擴展商業報告語言（XBRL）如何影響企業盈餘管理。我們的研究結果發現，強制採用XBRL減少盈餘管理。有關公司治理效果，大股東持股比例越高，強制採用XBRL與盈餘管理的負相關關係越弱，機構投資者持股比例越高，負相關關係越強。結果支持台灣政府強制公司採用XBRL申報財務資訊之政策。

並列關鍵字

XBRL ； 盈餘管理 ； 公司治理

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