本文之研究目的在於探究會計績效衡量(相對於市場績效衡量)對高階主管(此指總經理)現金薪酬之相對重要性是否受績效指標本身之特性、主管個人特質、公司特性、外部控制機制(如產品市場競爭程度)、市場與經濟環境之影響。研究結果發現績效指標本身之特性(如績效指標之相對精確性)、主管個人特質(如主管之年齡、年資、與董事會之關係)、公司特性(如公司潛在成長機會、公司規模、公司風險等)、產品市場競爭程度以及景氣循環等因素的確會影響會計績效衡量(相對於市場績效衡量)對高階主管現金薪酬之相對有用性。另外,研究亦發現高階主管持股比例之多寡對其薪酬與績效關聯性呈非線性之影響,亦即高階主管現金薪酬與市場績效(若為正)之正關聯性相對上呈現先提升、再降低而後提升之趨勢;並且高階主管持股比例、年齡及年資與高階主管現金薪酬間可能存有非線性關係。因此,當公司在考量高階主管薪酬時,應將此情境因素作全盤考量,才能發揮績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之功能。
The results of the paper show that decisive factors, such as the properties of the performance measures (i.e. the relative precision of the performance measures), personal characteristics (i.e. CEO's age, tenure, the relationship between CEO and the board), corporate characters (i.e. the firm's growth opportunity, size, and risk), competition in the product market, and the economic cycle, indeed have impacts on the relative uses of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts. Besides, we find that when CEO's personal stock holdings in the firm increase, the positive relation between stock-based performance (if positive) and CEO's cash compensation would be nonlinear(i.e. first increase, then lower, and finally raise), and there exist nonlinear relationships between CEO's cash compensation and his age, tenure or personal stock holdings. As a result, while contracting CEO's compensation, the board of the firm needs to wholly consider those significant factors, so as to improve the efficiencies of the governance roles of firm performance measures in CEO's compensation contracts.