This paper aims to discuss the relationship between managers’ remuneration and core agency problem in Taiwan, and measure whether the degree of association was affected by the life cycle. Based on the methodology in the studies of Chen-Lung Chin (2005), using R&D intensity, sales growth, capital spending rate, firm age as factors to determine the different stages of the life cycle. The study employs data of the firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2009-2015. The results show that the core agent problem has significant positive effect on managers' remuneration of the electronics industry. In addition, regarding the seats deviation as the agent variable of the core agent problem to explore this effect during different stages of the life cycle, the results indicate that the core agent problem has significant negative on managers' remuneration at growth stage, while it shows significant positive on managers' remuneration at both maturity stage and decline stage. To be more precise, the effect at the growth stage is minimal throughout the life cycle, however the effect at the decline stage is maximal.