上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構

CEO Compensation Structure in Taiwan's Listed Companies

林淑惠(Shu-Hui Lin) ； 胡星陽(Shing-Yang Hu)

《經濟論文》 31卷2期 (2003/06) Pp. 171-206

https://doi.org/10.29628/AEP.200306.0003

摘要

本文旨在研究公司成長機會和監督機制對經理人酬勞連結程度的影響。以台灣上市公司85-88年總經理酬勞為研究對象。我們發現成長機會高的公司有較高的酬勞連結程度。另外，實證發現，在大公司，公司監督機制和酬勞連結程度有顯著的互補關係。相對的，在小公司，監督機制和酬結程度有替代關係。總體而言，經理人酬勞與績效變數有顯著的連結。而監督機制和酬勞連結程度間的關係會隨公司規模而改變。

關鍵字

總經理 ； 薪資 ； 績效 ； 成長機會 ； 監督機制 ； 董事會 ； 所有權

並列摘要

This paper examines the effects of growth opportunities and monitoring mechanism on the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance measures. Our results are based on 1996~ 1999 CEO compensation data from companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that the sensitivity of CEO pay in growth firms is significantly higher than that in other firms. In addition, we find that in large firms, the monitoring mechanism and the sensitivity of CEO pay are complementary mechanisms, while the monitoring mechanism is a substitute for the sensitivity of CEO pay in small firms.

並列關鍵字

CEO ； Compensation package ； Performance ； Growth opportunity ； Monitoring mechanism ； Ownership ； Board of directors

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