盈餘管理、董事會組成及特性與高階主管薪酬關係之研究

A Study on Relationships among Earnings Management, Board Compositions and Characteristics and CEO Compensation

周美禛(Mei-Chen Chou)

指導教授 ： 莊忠柱

淡江大學/商管學院/管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2013.00666

摘要

自金融風暴以來，許多發生財務困難公司的高階主管仍能持續坐領高薪，因此「打擊肥貓」的成為大家關注的議題。本研究以2005年至2011年1347家在台灣股票上市上櫃公司為研究對象，利用複迴歸模型，以盈餘管理為自變數、董事會組成及特性為干擾變數(含獨立董事比例、外部董事比例、內部董事比例、法人機構董事比例、董事長兼任CEO及董事會規模)，高階主管薪酬為應變數，探討盈餘管理、董事會組成及特性與高階主管薪酬的關係。
本研究實證發現盈餘管理對於高階主管薪酬有顯著負向影響。外部董事比例及法人機構董事比例能增加盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響，而獨立董事比例、董事會規模及董事長兼任CEO則會減少盈餘管理對高階主管薪酬的影響。因此，外部董事及法人機構董事並未確實發揮監督功能以防止高階主管自利行為，為了保護投資者的利益，必須加強董事會的監督功能，才能避免高階主管藉由操弄盈餘而提升自身薪酬。本研究結果可為公司股東或其他利益相關者的參考依據。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 董事會組成及特性 ； 高階主管薪酬 ； 董事會規模

並列摘要

Although some corporation is default in finance, the CEO still has high compensations since the financial turmoil. Therefore, "Against Fat Cats" has become an issue of the public. In this study, 1347 Taiwanese companies in SEC and OTC are taken as the research objects spanning from 2005 to 2011. In this study, we use the multiple regression analysis to investigate the relationships among earnings management, board composition and characteristics and CEO compensation. The earnings management is independent variables and earnings management is dependent variable in the model. Besides, board composition and characteristics are the moderate variables including the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of outside directors, the proportion of inside directors,the proportion of institutional directors, the percentage of the chairman serves as a CEO and board size.
The finding is that the earnings management affects the CEO compensations negatively. The proportion of outside directors and institutional directors increase the effects of the earnings management on the CEO compensations but the proportion of independent directors, the board serves as a CEO as well as the board size decreases the effects of the earnings management on the CEO compensations. As a result, the outside directors and institutional directors does not function on the corporation governance to avoid the self-interested behavior of the CEO. Therefore, to protect the investors’ interest, it is necessary to strengthen the supervisory function of the board of directed that can prevent the CEO from manipulating the earnings management to increase the CEO compensations. The results of this study could be taken as a reference to the stakeholder.

並列關鍵字

Earnings Management ； Board Compositions and Characteristics ； CEO Compensation ； Board Size

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