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台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議

A Research on Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Performance Indicators of Taiwanese Business Groups

摘要


本文以國內十四家集團63家上市櫃公司為對象,針對其股權結構及董事會組成進行台灣集團企業控股型態及公司治理指標衡量之研究。本文從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義企業之最終控制者,以瞭解國內企業在股權結構型態上的特性及衡量公司治理指標時面臨的各種問題,嘗試可行的解決方法,並提出具體的計算程序與方法,發展適合國內學術研究及實務應用之股份控制權、盈餘分配權及席次控制權等指標之衡量方法。分析結果顯示,整體樣本之平均股份控制權、盈餘分配權與席次控制權分別為23.45%、10.77%及86.81%,平均盈餘分配權與股份控制權之偏離比為0.46,席次控制權與盈餘分配權之偏離倍數為144.27倍,亦即最終控制者可以一單位的出資獲取144單位以席次控制力衡量的實質控制力。實證分析顯示,家族控股型態之公司及席次(或股份)控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度較高之公司,經營績效顯著較差。

並列摘要


In this study of corporate governance, we examine corporate ownership structure, as well as the characteristics of different boards of directors, by using a sample of 14 Taiwanese business groups, along with their 63 affiliated companies, either listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange or traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We define the ultimate owner or owners as the entity or entities with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first identify the critical issues regarding measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights, and the board of directors' degree of independence, which are specific to corporate governance for Taiwanese companies. Our analysis indicates that the voting rights, cash flow rights, and the ratio of board members controlled by the ultimate owners to the board size are on average 23.45%, 10.77% and 86.8l%, respectively. The average deviation ratio (?) between cash-flow rights and voting rights is 0.46. The number of board seats controlled by the owners is 144.27 times greater than cash-flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owners get approximately 144 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. The empirical results show that family-controlled firms or firms with higher deviation of control from cash-flow rights are underperforming in terms of return on investment.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


陳潤茹(2017)。公司治理、企業社會責任與資金成本之關聯性研究〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2017.00696
謝佑承(2017)。不同生命週期下核心代理問題對高階經理人薪酬之影響:以電子業為例〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2017.00112
洪嘉穗(2016)。台灣上市櫃公司核心代理問題之研究〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2016.00129
華浤安(2015)。股權結構與企業永續性之關聯性:並論核心代理問題、國際化與產業之干擾效果。〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2015.00453
蕭任淵(2014)。整合類神經網路與Ohlson Model以公司治理角度探索股市擇時策略之研究〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2014.01181

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