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公司是否會管理盈餘以迎合投資人對股利的偏好?

Do Firms Manage Earnings to Cater to Investors' Preference for Dividends?

摘要


本研究探討公司是否會為了迎合投資人對股利的偏好而從事盈餘管理。Daniel, Denis, and Lalitha (2008)的研究指出:公司會為了達到股利門檻而從事盈餘管理,然而我們以樣本期間內發放股利的公司為子樣本進行進一步的分析,發現股利門檻和公司盈餘管理兩者間的關連性在此樣本中不再呈現正顯著,但投資人的股利偏好因子和公司盈餘管理則仍具有正向顯著的關係。故此,本研究的實證結果主張,公司從事管理盈餘的動機不僅僅只為了達成股利門檻,市場中投資人對股利的偏好才是公司管理盈餘的重要因素。

並列摘要


This paper examines whether firms manage earnings to cater to investors' preference for dividends. Daniel, Denis, and Lalitha (2008) indicate that firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds. We further analyze the subsample of firms’ paying dividends and find that earning management and meeting dividend threshold are not positively correlated as usual in the subsample. Moreover, earning management and investors' dividend preference are still consistently positively correlated in our analysis. Our study shows that in addition to the possibility that firms manage earnings for meeting dividend thresholds, dividend catering should be a vital factor that contributes to firms' earning management.

參考文獻


Baker, M., and J. Wurgler (2004a), “A Catering Theory of Dividends,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No.3, 1125-1165.
Baker, M., and J. Wurgler (2004b), “Appearing and Disappearing Dividends: the Link to Catering Incentives,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, 271-288.
Bergstresser, D., M. Desai, and J. Rauh (2006), “Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions, and Managerial Investment Decisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 1, 157-195.
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon (2006), “CEO Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from 1990s,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.80, 511-529.
Bhattacharya, S. (1979), “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the ‘Bird in then Hand’ Fallacy,” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No.1, 259-270.

被引用紀錄


林煜恩、池祥萱、王巧薇、劉懿萱(2023)。市場短視與經理人迎合動機:企業策略所扮演的角色會計評論(76),145-180。https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.202301_(76).0004

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