Politically connected CEOs and bank performance: Evidence from Chinese banks

具政治關係的CEO與銀行績效：以中國銀行為例

丁秀儀(Hsiu-I Ting)

《證券市場發展季刊》 32卷1期 (2020/03) Pp. 125-163

https://doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.202003_32(1).0004

摘要

This study examines whether political connections influence a bank's performance and/or risk-taking. The result affirms that CEOs of politically connected banks have no influence on bank performance or risk-taking, which could instead be explained by CEO power and board structures. Rent seeking, allies on the board, professional directors, and a gender-diversified board may balance out the marginal benefits and costs of political connections. This study also corroborates that the effect of political ties is subject to CEO power. Banks with politically connected CEOs who have considerable ownership power exhibit good performance and low risks, which supports ＂development theory.＂ Politically connected CEOs with strong expert power demonstrate rent seeking behaviors, which supports ＂political theory.＂

關鍵字

Political connection ； Bank performance ； Risk-taking ； CEO power

並列摘要

本研究探討政治關係是否影響銀行績效與/或風險承擔度。研究結果證實CEO的政治關係並不影響銀行績效或風險承擔度，而是受CEO權力與董事會結構的影響。尋租，董事會的盟友，專業董事，與性別多元化的董事會可能會抵銷政治關係的邊際收益與成本。本研究還證實CEO政治關係的影響取決於CEO的權力，當CEO有高的所有權，CEO的政治關係會提高銀行績效，降低風險，結果支持「發展理論」；當CEO有高的專家權，CEO的政治關係會展現尋租的行為，結果支持「政治理論」。

並列關鍵字

政治關係 ； 銀行績效 ； 風險承擔度 ； CEO權力

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