- 期刊
- OpenAccess
Corporate Governance and the Payment Decisions of Excess Cash Holdings
公司治理與超額現金持有之償付決策關係
摘要
本研究旨在探討台灣上市櫃企業公司治理與現金部位之關係，並進而分析公司超額現金的償付決策以及對公司績效的影響。首先，實證結果發現，股權結構與公司現金之持有呈非線性的關係，採用piecewise非線性模型時，發現隨著董監事股權的增加，公司的現金持有會先減少再增加，在股權持有10%下會出現反轉。此外，當公司有股權質押時，會持有較多的現金；當公司有獨立董事時，公司會持有較少的現金，此表示當公司治理越差時，公司會持有較高的現金。其次，發現當公司持有多餘現金，會考慮優先償還公司債，並不會用在資本支出、研發費用及股利支付。最後，當公司超額現金的變動愈大時，會削弱公司未來的成長潛力。
並列摘要
We set out in this study to examine the relationships between corporate governance, cash holding policies, payment decisions of excess cash holdings and the overall effects of excess cash holdings on the future value of publicly-listed firms in Taiwan. We find that the relationship between ownership and cash holdings is non-linear. The piecewise linear specifications reveal a fall and subsequent rise in cash holdings with an increase in board ownership; our findings suggest that the turning point for this effect is at the 10 per cent board ownership level. We also find that a higher collateralized ratio will have larger firm's cash holdings, whereas firms with an independent board tend to have smaller cash reserves, thereby indicating firms with weaker corporate governance structures are likely to have greater cash reserves. Further, our results demonstrate that firms with greater cash holdings may consider returning their bond debt. The capital expenditure, R&D expenditure and dividends are generally unrelated to a firm's cash position. Finally, we find that firms with greater change in cash reserves will decline their growth prospects.