Managerial Liability Coverage, Controlling Shareholders, and Ownership Structure

管理當局責任保險、控制股東和股權結構

劉政淮(Cheng-Hwai Liou) ； 紀信義(Hsin-Yi Chi) ； 翁慈青(Tzu-Ching Weng)

《管理與系統》 23卷3期 (2016/07) Pp. 397-424

摘要

本研究在探討管理當局利益掠奪（以控制權和現金流量權來衡量）與董監責任保險約定承保程度之關聯性。實證結果發現當公司控制股東與小股東存在較大代理問題時，則較會購買董監事責任保險。此外，我們進一步發現，若控制股東面臨較大訴訟風險時，將傾向購買相對異常較高額度的董監事責任保險承保額度。本文的結果指出當公司傾向透過購買董監事責任保險，來緩和控制股東與外部股東間代理衝突所引起的訴訟風險。

關鍵字

控制股東 ； 管理當局利益掠奪 ； 管理當局責任保險

並列摘要

This study investigates whether controlling shareholders with managerial entrenchment, as measured by greater deviation in cash flow and control rights, are associated with managerial liability coverage. Using a sample of director and officer (D&O) liability insurance data, we find that firms with more serious agency conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders are more likely to purchase D&O liability insurance. We also find that controlling shareholders who face greater litigation risk have an incentive to carry abnormally high D&O liability insurance coverage. Our results indicate that an incentive exists to acquire managerial liability coverage against litigation risks arising from incentive conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders.

並列關鍵字

Controlling Shareholder ； Managerial Entrenchment ； Managerial Legal Liability C overage

參考文獻

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