亞理斯多德與自由意志問題

本文試圖從近代有關自由意志之爭論的角度，來探討亞理斯多德「不動之運動者」的構想。首先，本文將說明，在何種意義上靈魂可被視為生物自我運動的不動之運動者。再者，在S. S. Meyer對亞理斯多德行為理論的分析基礎上，本文將證明，行為者之「道德品性」（德性或惡習）亦可扮演行為之「不動之運動者」的角色，因而可被呈現為亞理斯多德的自由意志概念。然而，本文將指出，Meyer的說法並無法正確地掌握道德品性作為不動之運動者之真實意義，因為在她的觀點下，道德品性只能作為行為的「被動形式」或「被動潛能」而已。換言之，Meyer完全忽略了道德品性在行為中扮演之主動性的角色。有鑑於Meyer說法之困難，本文將討論亞理斯多德在《形上學》第九書中對於「主動潛能」與「被動潛能」之區別，以便更深入、全面地解釋道德品性作為不動之運動者的意涵。換言之，本文將解釋，道德品性在何種意義上可作為我們行為的「主動形式」或「主動潛能」。然而，道德品性也不應只被視為行為的「主動潛能」而已，它更應被視為行為者之「本性」；因為，它其實與靈魂在生物自我運動中，以及技術在生產活動中，扮演著類似的角色。本文將指出，這是因為道德品性並非作用在他物之上，而是作用在行為者自身上的緣故。

關鍵字

自由意志；不動之運動者；道德品性；相容論；靈魂

並列摘要

This article attempts to explicate Aristotle's conception of the ”unmoved mover” from the perspective of the modern debate about free will. In the first place, I will illustrate in what sense the soul can be seen as the unmoved mover for the self-motion of living things. Secondly, on the basis of S. S. Meyer's analysis of Aristotle's theory of action, I try to prove that the ”moral character” of the agent (his virtue or vice) can play the role of ”unmoved mover” of action as well, and may therefore be represented as an Aristotelian concept of free will. However, I will also indicate that Meyer's consideration of moral character has not correctly captured its real meaning as the unmoved mover; on her view, moral character is merely a ”passive form” or ”passive potentiality” of our actions. That is, she utterly ignores the active role played by the moral character for our actions. In the face of the difficulty Meyer's consideration arouses, this article will discuss Aristotle's distinction between ”active” and ”passive potentiality” in Met. IX, in order to give a more comprehensive account of moral character as the unmoved mover. That is, I will illustrate in what sense moral character could be seen as the ”active form” or ”active potentiality” for our actions. However, moral character should not only be considered as the ”active potentiality” of action, it is rather to be seen as the ”nature” of the agent; it plays the role similar to that which the soul plays in the self-motion of living things, or which the skill plays in the technical production. I will make this point clear by showing that moral character is not exercised on other things, but on the agent itself.