論商業判斷法則於我國法制之適用－以企業併購為中心

董事會係公司之權力中樞，其作為關乎公司經營成敗，故公司法要求董事對公司盡受任人義務，且違反應對公司負賠償責任。惟商業情事瞬息萬變、錯綜複雜，因而經營決定有誤在所難免，尤其併購之必要性與條件有時見仁見智，或併購後續結果未發生預期之效益時，皆可能讓股東產生董事是否盡其義務之質疑。為保障董事決定不致動輒遭股東指摘違反義務，美國判例法遂發展出商業判斷法則作為保護董事及其經營決定之制度。但我國法制並未有相似制度，不論學說或司法實務均未能形成共識。本文擬研究商業判斷法則於我國法制是否應予引進、與我國法制下是否有所衝突，以及企併法修正條文對商業判斷法則適用是否有所影響等問題。最終於文末提出淺見作為結論，盼能為我國法制尋得相對合宜之規範模式。

關鍵字

企業併購；利益衝突；受任人義務；注意義務；忠實義務；商業判斷法則；股東代表訴訟；特別委員會

並列摘要

The board of directors is invested with authority to run the business of a corporation, so it members are required to owe fiduciary duty to the corporation in which they serve. However, the board decisions may turn out to be wrong in some circumstances and shareholders may bring suits against directors for wrong decisions they made. In U.S., the business judgment rule (BJR) protects decision-makers by refraining courts from reviewing the merits of decisions at issue. As Taiwan's statutes have no similar mechanism which protects directors and their decisions, whether to use U.S.-typed BJR in litigations becomes highly controversial. This article will address some fundamental questions concerning the application of BJR in Taiwan, including whether Taiwan should apply BJR in judicial proceeding, what potential issues are in applying BJR in Taiwan legal system and under newly-amended Mergers and Acquisitions Act. This article will provide suggestions as conclusion in order for future regulation reform of better corporate governance.

並列關鍵字

merger and acquisition ； conflict of interest ； fiduciary duty ； duty of care ； duty of loyalty ； business judgment rule ； shareholder derivative suit ； special committee