Earnings management in family firms: The role of inside directors

家族企業之盈餘管理行為－內部董事的調節效果

Yi-Hui Tai

《交大管理學報》 37卷1期 (2017/06) Pp. 77-114

摘要

This paper investigates earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of inside directors. The empirical results show that family firms are more likely to engage in accruals management than in real earnings management. The compensation to inside directors for their director role is far less than that for their manager role, and thus the incentive for inside directors to share private information individually is not strong. However, increasing the proportion of inside directors and bringing together all private information is one workable way for family firms to reduce the possibility of engaging in accruals management.

關鍵字

Family firms ； Real earnings management ； Accruals management ； Inside director proportion ； Inside director compensation

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