Controlling Shareholders and Earnings Informativeness: Evidence from Taiwan

控制股東代理問題與盈餘資訊性－以台灣上市公司為例

呂瑞芳(Jei-Fang Lew) ； 吳幸蓁(Shing-Jen Wu)

《Asia Pacific Management Review》 18卷1期 (2013/03) Pp. 93-124+vi

https://doi.org/10.6126/APMR.2013.18.1.06

摘要

控制權與現金流量權的高度偏離乃台灣上市公司的主要特色，不同於過去文獻對控制權的衡量係以投票權為主，本研究則採用控制股東所能掌握的董事席次比例來衡量此控制權，探討其與現金流量權之偏離程度是否影響公司的盈餘資訊性。以台灣上市公司為研究樣本，實證結果顯示當董事席次控制權與現金流量權之偏離程度愈大時盈餘資訊性愈低。

關鍵字

盈餘資訊性 ； 所有權結構 ； 董事席次控制權

並列摘要

Taiwanese listed corporations, characterized by a high degree of separation between control rights and cash flow rights, are empirically studied in this research. This study investigates how the separation of cash flow rights from board seat control rights, as distinct from voting rights, affects the informativeness of earnings, as measured by the relationship between returns and earnings. This study extends the extant research by investigating the extent to which the level of disparity between these two rights affects the magnitude of earnings informativeness. Based on an empirical sample of Taiwanese listed corporations, the results indicate that earnings are generally less informative when there is a divergence between board seat control rights and cash flow rights.

並列關鍵字

Earnings informativeness ； ownership structure ； board seat control rights

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