近年來全球各公司一連串的弊案接連發生,部分的原因為管理者可能為了自身利益或為了達成預期盈餘目標進行盈餘操縱,使盈餘數字無法顯示實際之經營狀況。然而由於公司管理者與投資者間存在著資訊不對稱之問題,因此投資者無法事先從財務報表中發現企業有盈餘管理之現象。本研究欲探討企業之資訊透明度與盈餘管理之關聯性,以瞭解投資人是否可藉由判斷企業透明度之良窳推論企業進行盈餘管理的程度。 本研究以第一屆證券基金委員會「資訊揭露評鑑系統」評鑑結果,作為公司透明度之衡量指標,並探討公司的資訊透明度與盈餘管理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示,透明度愈高的企業,其盈餘管理程度愈低。此外,本研究亦以第一屆至第五屆資訊評鑑等級之變動,檢驗公司資訊揭露評鑑等級下降時,其盈餘管理之程度是否會上升。實證結果發現,當企業的透明度等級下降時,其盈餘管理程度會提高。
A series of financial reporting frauds have taken place world-widely in recent years. Part of reason stems from the manipulation of earnings by managers. However, the market does not notice the possibility of earnings management due to the information asymmetry between managers and investors. Disclosure can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and thus may reveal earnings management. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the transparency in information disclosure of a company can reflect its extent of earnings management. This study uses the first “Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking Results” provided by Securities and Futures Information Center in Taiwan as a proxy of information transparency. This study investigates the relation between information transparency and the degree of earnings management. The empirical results show that the higher is company’s information transparency; the lower is the extent of its earnings management. This research also examines whether disclosure ranking change will lead to the change in degree of earnings management. The results indicate the extents of earnings management will increase when a company’s information transparency is lowered.