董事會連結、投資決策與經營績效

Board Interlocking, Investment Decision and Corporate Performance

王睦舜(Mu-Shun Wang) ； 何文榮(Wun-Rounon Ho) ； 曾國雄(Gwo-Hshiung Tzeng) ； 張惠敏(Hwoai-Ming Chang)

《臺北科技大學學報》 42卷2期 (2009/12) Pp. 121-145

https://doi.org/10.29768/JNTUT.200912.0008

摘要

本研究探索以董事會連結為主題的投資決策與經營績效之間的關聯性，我們發現這個研究結果很有趣，可以很滿意地去解釋管理者職位固守假說與管家假說。由於董事會功能的不同，使得管理者會追求不同的目標以保護自身利益，當董事會對管理階層是友善地並提供諮詢意見，管理者會較有膽量去推動一些長遠的投資計畫。相反地，董事會若擺出就是要監督管理層的樣子，管理者擔心被撤換或調動，傾向於固守職位以降低資本開支和被動地接受命令。
我們也得到較多精細地結論，這是本文在公司治理方面有關董事會的探索之主要貢獻。例如董事會連結可以提供董事會較多的資訊以降低市場不確定，不過董事會對介入管理層的日常事務並不感興趣，而且這個關係為負；董事會連結強度越高則投資決策越低以及董事會連結的功能為友善地輔導管理者，其市場報酬會高於監督性質的董事會，投資活動也會增加。

關鍵字

董事會連結 ； 投資決策 ； 友善地董事會 ； 追蹤資料 ； 兩階段迴

並列摘要

We explore the relationship between investment decision and firm performance by the interlocking directorship. We find the result is very interesting which both can get satisfied explanation include the management entrenchment hypothesis and stewardship hypothesis. Owing to the function of board is different such that the managers pursuer different goal to protect their own interests. When the board is friendly to offer the opinion, the managers have more dare to investing for the future growing of the company, on the other hand, the board present their monitor to CEO, CEO perceive the risk of turnover, they are inclined to entrenchment and reduce the capital expenditure and passive for the order.
We get more precise conclusion that is special contribution for this corporate governance about board. For example, board interlocking can offer more information to reduce the information uncertainly. But board don't interfere the operating activities of managers. And the relationship is negative. Board tie strength less than investment decision and the friendly shareholders higher stock than others, the investing activity will increase.

並列關鍵字

board interlocking ； investment decision ； friendly board ； panel data ； two stage regression