董事會監督下的投資決策與績效：考慮過去績效與自我選擇偏誤的影響

本研究檢驗董事會監督機制下，績效回饋對管理人之投資決策之影響。由於，投資決策本身並非隨機，而是由管理人選擇其所偏好的策略，即投資決策本身存在潛在的自我選擇偏誤。因而，若實證模型忽略廠商自我選擇偏誤的影響，將使實證結果產生偏差。基此，本研究在實證時採Heckman二階段決策模型，以控制自我選擇偏誤的影響。第一階段，係以1914個上市電子資訊業為樣本建立Probit 模型，以檢驗董事會監督機制對管理人投資決策之影響；第二階段納入自我選擇修正因子，以OLS迴歸確立投資與績效之關係。實證結果顯示當企業獲利大於同業時，總經理兼任董事長、董事會規模以及董事持股與企業投資決策呈負向關係。第二階段，在控制自我選擇修正因子後，企業投資與績效呈顯著的正向關係。

關鍵字

自我選擇偏誤；董事會結構；公司治理

並列摘要

This study aims to explore the effect of performance feedback on investment decision under board government. A firm’s investment decision is not made at a random, but is mangers to self-select into their preferred strategies. In other words, there is a potential of self-selection bias in investment decision. If the self-selection bias is not taken into account then any conclusions drawn may be invalid. Hence, this study controls self-selection bias via Heckman’s two-stage decision model. The first stage, this study utilizes a Probit model to examine a firm’s board government how to influence its investment decision for 1914 samples of publicly traded electronics industry. And the inverse Mills ratio that corrects for self-selection matters in the second stage OLS regression. The empirical results of the first stage, this study found that there is a negatively relationship between the CEO duality, board size and directors' ownership and increase investment when performance below their goals. The second stage, this study found that there is a positive relationship between firm’s investment and performance when the self-selection bias has been controlled.