從第二次波灣戰爭檢視伊拉克情報、安全組織之陷落

The Information Failure of Iraq's Intelligence and Security Organization in Gulf War Ⅱ

施澤淵(Tzer-Iuan Shih)

《遠景基金會季刊》 6卷2期 (2005/04) Pp. 131-183

https://doi.org/10.7063/PQ.200504.0131

摘要

1990年伊拉克入侵科威特之初，世人即質疑伊拉克的情報、安全機制，是否發生嚴重的缺失，促使海珊輕率發動戰爭而導致挫敗。第二次美伊波灣戰爭之前，海珊擁有龐大的情報、安全組織與戰爭面的優勢，但卻不敵美軍各項情報作為的催化與凌厲的攻勢，導致伊拉克政權快速敗亡。值此伊拉克前朝殘餘勢力持續挑起動亂，阻撓戰後重建之際，愈加突顯其各級情報、安全組織未能及時阻止海珊挑起戰爭，避免國祚陷入絕境的重要性。
本文擬就海珊主政時期，有關伊拉克各級情報、安全組織發展沿革，與第一次波灣戰爭之後，情報、安全組織遞嬗的過程加以論述。其次，就第二次美伊波灣戰爭時期，有關各級「情報安全體系、預警機制、領導風範、內部管理、情報實務、安全維護」等作為，釐清伊拉克何以擁有如此綿密的情報、安全組織，仍然產生戰略性、結構性的錯誤，致使國家安全與人民福祉，陷入萬劫不復的困境。再者，海珊徒有十萬共和衛隊及二萬餘名特別共和衛隊，除在作戰初期「海珊敢死隊」及部分共和衛隊，在南部及巴格達確有激烈的抵抗外，作戰全期鮮有堅強的反擊行動。
尤有甚者，美軍在2003年4月7日突破巴格達城防之後，眾多的伊拉克內閣官員、軍事將領及其情報、安全主管，卻在無聲無息中從人間蒸發，甚且不戰而降。本篇也嘗試在2003年12月13日美軍捕獲海珊前後，就其「人員情報」與美軍「科技情報」，兩者在高科技、現代化戰爭中的功能，以及情報組織與情報實務的角色、地位及其編組架構，探究其兩者的落差，進而啓發國人對伊拉克情報、安全工作有所省思與體認。

關鍵字

情報 ； 人員情報 ； 科技情報 ； 預警機制

並列摘要

Since the beginning of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, analysts had questioned whether Saddam Hussein was misled by inaccurate information provided by his intelligence and security agencies in waging a war against Kuwait, which resulted in defeat. Saddam Hussein had superiority of intelligence and security networks and battle grounds at his command before Gulf War Ⅱ. However, the US forces employed various intelligence maneuvers and fierce attacks to precipitate the demise of the Iraqi regime. Currently, royalists of the former regime are still trying to incite insurgencies and use terrorist attacks to influence post-war reconstruction. This kind of situation highlights the significance of Iraq's intelligence and security networks in preventing wars and safeguarding national security.
The thesis discussed the establishment of different levels of Iraq's intelligence and security networks during Saddam's rule and the reformation of them after Gulf War Ⅰ. From the aspects of ”intelligence and security systems.” ”preventive mechanisms.” ”leadership,” ”internal management,” ”intelligence practice” and ”security safeguard.” the author examined the reasons why Iraqi intelligence and security organizations, in spite of their comprehensiveness, made such strategic and structural mistakes, which inflicted great pain and suffering upon the Iraqi people and jeopardized national security. The one hundred thousand Republican Guards and the more than twenty thousand Special Republican Guards showed little resistance and took almost no action in counter-attack except at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, after the US forces took over Baghdad, many high-ranking Iraqi military officers and intelligence and security chiefs simply disappeared or surrendered without a fight. The lacking of appropriate counter-measures consequently accelerated the collapse of the Saddam Regime. The thesis also compared the ”human intelligence” of Iraq and the ”high-tech intelligence” of the U.S. around Dec. 13, when Saddam was captured. The roles and functions of these two kinds of intelligence in current high-tech wars were discussed to present the different features of them, hoping to provide reviews and thoughts on Iraq's intelligence and security activities.

並列關鍵字

Intelligence ； Human Intelligence ； High-tech Intelligence ； Preventive Mechanisms

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