本文從守勢現實主義(defensive realism)的理論中推論出維持現狀、嚇阻戰略與昂貴信號,以作為檢視冷戰後中共安全政策的指標。本文從1995-96年臺海危機中論證:第一,中共的外交政策旨在維持既有的國際秩序,其對外的行為以維持現狀為主;第二,中共的國防政策屬於防禦性的,因此其戰略以嚇阻為主;第三,中共採取昂貴信號的作法,以表示其防禦性、維持現狀,或者是合作的意圖。所以,本文證明冷戰後的中國大陸追求自我防禦,其安全政策是屬於防禦性的。
From defensive realism theory, this article infers status-quo policy, deterrence strategy, and costly signals to estimate PRC Post-Cold War security policy. Empirically, this article examines the case of 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis and concludes that: first. China engages status-quo foreign policy to maintain the international order second. China's defense policy emphasizes on deterrence strategy third, China adopts costly signals to unfold its defensive, status-quo, or cooperative intention. This article argues that, therefore. Post-Cold War China is a self-preserving state with defensive security policy.