產業審計專家與獨立董監事對新發行公司債資金成本的影響

The Impact of Auditor Industry Specialization and Independent Directors/Supervisors on the Capital Cost of Newly Issued Corporate Bonds

簡俱揚(Chu-Yang Chien) ； 陳玉梅(Yu-Mei Chen)

《當代會計》 10卷1期 (2009/05) Pp. 99-130

https://doi.org/10.6675/JCA.2009.10.1.04

摘要

本研究以1998-2004年台灣公開發行公司發行之不可轉換公司債為研究樣本，研究產業審計專家及獨立董監事對公司債利率的影響。Jensen and Meckling (1976)於代理理論架構中指出，債券的持有人及擁有公司債權的一般債權人須面對使得他們債務請求權遭受違約的代理衝突。在良好的審計及監督機制下，或許可有效降低代理衝突所引發的不良影響。本文檢測結果發現，由具有產業專業能力會計師所查核的公司，其新發行公司債利率顯著較低，表示公司債的債權人認同具產業專家能力之會計師可有效降低代理衝突。獨立董監事之實證結果，亦顯示公司治理的監督機制，亦可得到債權人之認同。

關鍵字

審計品質 ； 產業審計專家 ； 獨立董監事 ； 代理成本

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to test how auditor industry specialization and independent directors / supervisors affect the cost of newly issued corporate bond that use non-convertible bonds issued by Taiwan's public companies from 1998 to 2004. Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory points out that bondholder and creditor have to face default risk due to agent’s conflict of interest. With good audit quality and monitoring mechanism, adverse effect of agents’ conflict of interest can be minimized. Our study finds that companies that were audited by industry specialization have significantly lower coupon interest rate for newly issued corporate bonds. This indicates that creditors recognize that auditor industry specialization can effectively reduce agents' conflict of interest. Results also show that companies that have appointed independent directors / supervisors can significantly reduce their cost for newly issued corporate bonds.

並列關鍵字

audit quality ； auditor industry specialization ； independent directors/supervisors ； agency cost

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