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  • 學位論文

薪酬委員會組成與高階經理人總薪酬之關連性─探討獨立董事新制度發布前後之影響

The Relationship between Compensation Committee and Total Compensation of High-level Managers ─ Discussion on the Influence of Independent Director's New System

指導教授 : 李德冠

摘要


2008年金融海嘯期間,台灣在公司治理方面發生公司營運遭受虧損,但高階經理人卻依然領取高薪的情況,在這樣的狀況下台灣於2011年通過證券交易法強制公司設立薪酬委員會。本研究是在探討薪酬委員會的組成與高階經理人總薪酬之間的關聯性,將薪酬委員會的成員區分為獨立董事以及外部專業人士兩類,分別研究其對於薪酬的影響來探討其作用。金管會於2013 年底要求所有上市(櫃)公司應自2015 年起,於董監事任期屆滿改選時選任獨立董事,其人數不得少於二人,且不得少於董事席次五分之一。由金管會的新規定可以將研究期間區分為2015年前的新制度發布前,以及2015年後的新制度發布後,探討不同制度下是否會有不同的研究結果。 實證結果發現,薪酬委員會中獨立董事成員的比例越高,高階經理人可以獲得更多的薪酬;而外部專業人士佔的比例越高,高階經理人的總薪酬會越少;比較前後期不同制度的變化後也得到了相同的結果。由上述結果可發現似乎薪酬委員會中的外部專業人士相較於獨立董事是較能發揮監督薪酬的功能。

並列摘要


During the financial tsunami in 2008, Taiwan suffered a loss from corporate governance in terms of corporate governance, but high-level managers were still receiving high salaries. In such a situation, Taiwan established a Compensation Committee through the Securities and Exchange Act in 2011. This study examines the relationship between the composition of the Compensation Committee and the total compensation of the high-level managers. The members of the Compensation Committee are divided into two categories: independent directors and external professionals, examine their impact on total compensation. At the end of 2013, the Financial Supervisory Commission(FSC) was regulate all listed companies to elect independent directors at the time of the re-election of the directors and supervisors from 2015, and the number of them shall not be less than two and shall not be less than one fifth of the seats of the directors. The new rules of the FSC can divide the research period into the pre-2015 system and new system after 2015, to explore whether different regulations will have different findings. Empirical results show that higher proportion of independent directors in the compensation committee, the high-level managers can get more total remuneration. Also, higher proportion of external professionals in the compensation committee, the high-level managers can get more total remuneration. I also get the similar results under the comparison of the different regulations. It seems that the external professionals in the compensation committee are more likely to monitor excess compensation than the independent directors.

參考文獻


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