薪酬委員會之設置對高階主管薪酬與公司治理、公司績效間關聯性之影響

The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Association of Performance, Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation

黃勻萱(Yun-Hsuan Huang)

指導教授 ： 張慧珊

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201300470

摘要

我國金管會於2011年3月宣布上市(櫃)實施資本額超過100億元以上者，須於2011年9月30日前設置薪資報酬委員會(Compensation Committee)；未達100億元者則須於2011年12月31日前設置完成。薪酬委員會主要功能是協助董事會建立公司管理透明化之程序，並訂定高階管理者及董事之績效考核標準和薪酬結構。國內立法者希望藉由強制設立薪酬委員會來建立一道監督機制，並有助企業將董監事及經理人之個人表現、經營績效及未來風險等其與薪酬有效連結，訂出合理的薪酬。故本研究主要是為探討在薪酬委員會設置後，高階主管薪酬與公司績效、公司治理與其他因素間關聯性之影響。結果指出，薪酬委員會設置後，反而弱化了薪酬與績效間之關聯性；另薪酬委員會之設置對於獨立董事占董事會比例與薪酬間之關聯性有強化效果。本研究認為可能之原因為(1)公司間高階主管互兼獨立董事或薪酬委員；(2)薪酬委員會成員與執行長之私人關係；(3)基於執行長對於董事提名未做反對，此種互惠態度使獨立董事不易對高階主管薪酬有所異議；(4)獨立董事尚未強制設立。此外，薪酬委員會之設置對於風險與高階主管薪酬之關係有強化效果，代表薪酬委員會的介入，能提升公司風險與薪酬間之連結性。

關鍵字

公司績效 ； 公司治理 ； 薪酬委員會

並列摘要

The Financial Supervisory Commission announced in March 2011 that companies with capital exceeding 10 billion should set up compensation committee before September, 2011, while companies with capital less than 10 billion should set up the committee before December, 2011. Compensation committee is set up to assist the board of directors to develop the openness of corporate governance, and to establish performance evaluation and compensation structure of management and directors. Regulatory agency wants to frame a supervision mechanism by enforcing the establishment of compensation committee, which would help companies to effectively link directors’ and managers’ individual performance, operation results and business risk with reasonable compensations. The study mainly discusses the impact of compensation committee on the association of corporate performance, corporate governance and CEO compensation. The results show that, on the contrary to our expectation, compensation committee weakens the correlation between management performance and compensations. Furthermore, compensation committee strengthens the association between the proportion of independent directors and management compensations. There are several possible reasons: (1) Interlocking independent directors or compensation committee members between companies. (2) Personal relationship between CEO and compensation committee members. (3) Since CEO did not oppose the nomination of independent directors, which makes the independent directors unable to bring up any objections for compensation of senior managers. (4) The assignment of independent directors is not mandatory. Finally, the relationship between corporation risk and management compensation has been strengthened, which means that the intervention of compensation committee enhances the association between risk and management compensations.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance ； Compensation Committee ； Corporate Performance

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