信用評等為專業評估團體對企業未來營運狀況所作的評估,其能顯示企業整體信用風險、償債能力等等,因此也能做為評估經理人績效的指標之一。本研究以2009年至2013年上市公司(不含金融業)為研究樣本,以信用評等之級別作為信用風險高低之指標,首先探討當公司信用風險越高時,是否其經理人績效會因此受影響而使經理人異動之可能性越高,接著探討是否當經理人績效與薪酬高度連結時(薪酬績效敏感度高),會減緩信用風險與經理人異動之關係。最後則探討是否薪酬委員會的設置,能調節信用風險與經理人異動之間的關係。本文研究結果顯示,當企業的信用風險越高時,其經理人異動之可能性越高,且高薪酬績效敏感度會降低信用風險對經理人異動之影響,然而薪酬委員會的設置似乎無法調節信用風險對經理人異動之影響。
The credit rating is the score which evaluates company’s future operational condition rated by professional institution. It also reflects the company’s credit risk and solvency. Therefore, the credit rating can also be considered an indicator of executives’ performance. Except for financial industry companies, I use companies listing in Taiwan stock exchange during 2009 to 2013 to conduct this research. And I use the score of credit rating as the level of credit risk. First, I investigate whether the credit risk will have impact on CEO turnover rate. Then I tend to find out whether high Pay-Performance Sensitivity will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Finally, I try to learn whether the compensation committee will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Empirical results show that the credit risk has a positive effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, I find Pay-Performance Sensitivity negatively moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. However, it seems that the compensation committee could not moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover.