績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之相對重要性

An Analysis of the Relative Importance of Performance Measures in Executive Compensation Contracts

洪玉舜(Yu-shun Hung)

指導教授 ： 王泰昌

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/博士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.02375

摘要

本文之研究目的在於將高階主管(此指總經理)薪酬契約分別抽釐出現金與股票薪酬，探究會計、市場兩績效衡量對高階主管薪酬契約（分別探討現金、股票薪酬）之相對重要性是否受績效指標本身之特性、主管個人持股狀況及特質、公司特性、外部控制機制（如產品市場競爭程度）、產業特性、景氣循環等情境因素之影響。
實證結果發現（以下，皆以公司稅前息前盈餘作為會計績效指標以及公司股東財富變動作為市場績效指標之衡量變數予以闡述說明），在績效衡量本身之特性方面，結果顯示在訂定高階主管現金、股票薪酬政策時，若市場績效指標相對上為較具干擾性之衡量指標，則會提升高階主管現金、股票薪酬與會計績效衡量（若為正）之正向關聯性，其中現金薪酬之結果與Sloan (1993)之研究結果相似。
在公司成長機會方面，顯示當公司具有高度成長機會時，會計績效指標（若為正）與高階主管現金、股票薪酬間之正關聯性皆會降低。在高階主管現金薪酬方面，支持相關薪酬研究之推測，說明當公司愈具有成長機會時，當期盈餘所能捕捉到之高階主管行為之未來經濟結果愈少(Bushman and Smith 2001)，顯示盈餘相對於股價績效之干擾性增強，因此高階主管現金薪酬與會計績效衡量之關聯性愈低，而現金薪酬與市場績效衡量之關聯性提升。
在公司規模方面，結果說明當公司規模愈大時，則會顯著降低高階主管股票薪酬與市場、會計兩績效指標間之正關聯性；並顯著降低高階主管現金薪酬與會計績效指標（若為正）間之正關聯性，此可能係因於公司規模愈大時，高階主管所需肩負之責任範圍亦愈大，此時其行為之經濟結果非以單一會計績效即能衡量，因此其現金薪酬與單一會計績效之關聯性降低，而可能加重現金薪酬與另一市場績效之關聯性。
有關公司風險方面，顯示當環境不確定性愈高時，高階主管薪酬（不論股票或現金薪酬）與市場績效指標之正關聯性顯著降低，而其薪酬與會計績效指標之正關聯性顯著提升，說明當環境不確定性愈高時，高階主管相對上較顧慮風險（相對於誘因）之因素，此時公司應降低外部績效（如市場績效）與薪酬之連結，而以內部績效（會計績效）之連結予以替代。
有關公司負債比率方面，結果顯示當公司負債比率愈大時，高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效衡量指標間之正關聯性顯著提高，說明當公司有多元化投資人（如債權人）時，會較注重在財務報表之獲利指標上的把關，因此應著重高階主管之股票薪酬與會計績效指標間之關聯性，以作為事前承諾之機制；而在高階主管現金薪酬方面，當公司負債比率愈高時，高階主管現金薪酬與市場績效衡量（若為正）間之正關聯性顯著降低，符合John and John (1993)之論點。
在高階主管持股比例方面，就線性模型而言，結果顯示在高階主管股票薪酬契約中，當高階主管持股比例增加時，其股票薪酬與會計績效衡量（若為正）之正關聯性會顯著降低，而與市場績效衡量（若為正）之正關聯性未有顯著變化；在高階主管現金薪酬契約中，當高階主管持股比例增加時，公司有降低高階主管現金薪酬與市場績效指標間關聯性之趨勢。另一方面，結果顯示高階主管現金薪酬與其持股比例間存有非線性之關係，如曲線(curvilinear)關係；且高階主管持股比例之多寡對其薪酬（不論現金或股票）與績效關聯性之影響可能亦存有非線性之關係。
有關高階主管與董事會之關係層面上，發現當高階主管兼任董事職位時，其現金薪酬水準明顯增加，而股票薪酬水準未有明顯變化。在薪酬績效關聯性方面，於高階主管現金薪酬契約中，當主管兼任董事職位時，其現金薪酬與會計、市場兩績效衡量指標間之正關聯性皆顯著降低；而在高階主管股票薪酬契約中，當主管兼任董事職位時，其股票薪酬僅與會計績效衡量指標間之正關聯性顯著降低。另一方面，當高階主管兼任董事長職位時，其現金薪酬與市場績效衡量間之正關聯性顯著降低，而現金薪酬與會計績效衡量間之正關聯性反而顯著提升；且當高階主管兼任董事長時，其股票薪酬水準明顯減少，而現金薪酬水準未有明顯變化，此與高階主管擔任董事之結果不同。
有關產品市場競爭程度方面，當公司所處之產品市場愈具競爭性（此即 值愈小），其高階主管股票薪酬水準明顯增加。在產品市場競爭程度與薪酬績效敏感性方面，於高階主管股票薪酬契約中，結果偏向支持「風險差異化假說」，顯示當產品市場競爭程度愈大（ 值愈小）時，高階主管較顧慮風險（相對於誘因）之考量，因而降低其股票薪酬與會計、市場績效間之正關聯性，此亦較符合Hart (1983)之理論研究。綜合股票與現金薪酬之實證結果，顯示當高階主管為風險趨避者時，由於股票薪酬之風險高於現金薪酬者，當產品市場愈具競爭性時，高階主管面對之外在環境風險愈高，公司傾向提高其現金薪酬與績效之連結以取代股票薪酬與績效之連結。
在景氣循環方面，顯示當景氣處於衰退期，高階主管現金薪酬與會計績效衡量（若為正）之正關聯性（相對於市場績效衡量）顯著降低；而當景氣處於穩定成長期，高階主管現金薪酬與會計績效衡量（若為正）之正關聯性（相對於市場績效衡量）顯著提高。有關產業特性方面，發現當公司屬於高科技產業（ ），其高階主管薪酬水準（不論現金或股票薪酬）顯著提高。且當公司屬於高科技產業（ ），高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效指標之正關聯性顯著降低。
由此可知，績效指標本身之特性、主管個人持股狀況及特質、公司特性、產品市場競爭程度以及景氣循環等因素對於會計、市場兩績效衡量在高階主管薪酬契約中之相對有用性之影響，的確會因不同薪酬制度而有所變化。因此，當公司在考量高階主管薪酬契約時，應就不同薪酬制度與重要情境因素間之連結作全盤考量，才能發揮績效衡量指標在高階主管薪酬契約中之功能。

關鍵字

高階主管薪酬 ； 薪酬績效敏感性 ； 公司控制機制 ； 公司特性

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to separate stock-based compensation from cash compensation in CEO’s total remuneration contracts. And further, we would like to investigate whether the relative uses of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts (including cash- and stock-based compensation) would be affected by the properties of the performance measures, personal characteristics, corporate characters, external control mechanisms (e.g. competition in the product market), the industrial character, and the economic cycle.
The result of the paper shows that in the aspect of the properties of the performance measures, if the market performance measure is noisier than the accounting one, the positive relation between accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s cash- and stock-based compensation would relatively more increase, particularly the finding of cash compensation being similar as that of Sloan (1993).
In the aspect of the growth opportunity of the corporate, the finding supports the conjecture of principal-agent-based compensation research, which shows that when firms with significant investment opportunities, current earnings will poorly reflect future period consequences of current managerial actions, exhibiting the noises of the earnings relative to the market performance measures increase. Thus, the accounting performance measure is likely to exhibit low sensitivity, while the market performance measure will have high sensitivity in CEO’s cash-based compensation contracts.
In the aspect of the size of the corporate, the result indicates that when the size of the firm is larger, the positive relation between both performance measures, including accounting and market measures (if positive), and CEO’s stock-based compensation would significantly more decrease. Moreover, the positive relation between the accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s cash-based compensation would relatively more decrease. The possible reason is that the larger the firm’s size, the greater CEO’s responsibility, so as to the consequences of CEO’s actions immeasurable by unique accounting performance measure.
In the aspect of the corporate risk, the result exhibits that when the uncertainty of the environment is higher, CEO’s would relatively more concern about the factor of the risk relative to the incentive. Thus, the firm requires decreasing the link between CEO’s compensation and external performance measures (i.e. the market performance), and replacing with increasing the link between CEO’s compensation and internal performance measures (i.e. the accounting performance).
As for the leverage ratio of the corporate, the result exhibits that when the company has various investors (i.e. debt-holders), they would pay more attention on the profit indicators of the financial statement. Thus, the company requires emphasizing the sensitivity of CEO’s stock-based compensation with the accounting performance measure as the mechanism of the pre-commitment. As to CEO’s cash-based compensation, the finding is consistent with the point of John and John (1993).
In the aspect of CEO’s personal stock holdings of the managed firm, the result exhibits that CEO’s cash-based compensation and his stock holding exist nonlinear relationship, such as curlinear relationship. Furthermore, the impact of CEO’s stock holdings on the sensitivity of his cash- and stock-based compensation with performance measures may have nonlinear relationship.
In the aspect of the relation between CEO and the board, the finding shows that when CEO is the inside director, his cash-based compensation would significantly rise, while his stock-based compensation would not change significantly. As for the sensitivity of compensation and performance, when CEO is the inside director, the positive relation between both performance measures, including accounting and market performances (if positive), and CEO’s cash-based compensation would significantly more decrease. Moreover, the positive relation between the accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s stock-based compensation would significantly more decrease. In addition, when CEO is the board chair, the positive relation between the market performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s cash-based compensation would significantly more decrease, while the positive relation between the accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s cash-based compensation would conversely more increase. Further, the level of his stock-based compensation would significantly fall, but his cash-based compensation would be unchanged, different from the result of CEO being the inside director.
In the aspect of competition in the product market, the result shows that when the product market is more competitive (i.e. value is lower), CEO’s stock-based compensation significantly rise. Moreover, combining the results of the cash- and stock-based compensation contracts shows that when CEO is a risk averter and the product market is more competitive (i.e. the uncertainty is higher), the firm tends to raise the link between CEO’s cash-based compensation and performance measures to replace the link between CEO’s stock-based compensation and performance measures. This results from the risk of stock-based compensation being higher than that of cash-based compensation.
In the aspect of economic cycle, the result shows that during economic downturn (steadily growth), the positive relation between the accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s cash-based compensation would relatively more decrease (increase). As for the industrial character, the finding shows that when the firm belongs to high technology, CEO’s cash- and stock-based compensation would significantly rise. Moreover, when the firm belongs to high technology, the positive relation between the accounting performance measure (if positive) and CEO’s stock-based compensation would significantly more decrease.
Therefore, decisive factors, such as the properties of the performance measures, personal characteristics, corporate characters, competition in the product market, and the economic cycle, having impacts on the relative uses of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts, indeed would vary with different compensation systems. As a result, while contracting CEO’s compensation, the board of the firm needs wholly to consider those significant factors so as to improve the efficiencies of the governance roles of firm performance measures in CEO compensation.

並列關鍵字

corporate control mechanism ； executive compensation ； corporate character ； pay-performance sensitivity

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