在傳統代理理論下,薪酬契約被認為是解決股東與經理人間之代理問題ㄧ項重要的機制;然而,台灣多數企業為家族控制型態,當代理問題的性質由所有權與經營權之間的代理問題,轉變為控制股東與小股東之間的核心代理問題時,薪酬契約是否仍為決定經理人薪酬的主要因素,為本文主要研究目的。 行政院金融監督管理委員會在2007年1月4日修正「公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則」及「公司募集發行有價證券公開說明書應行記載事項準則」部分條文,規定於2007年編製年報時,上市櫃公司董監事、經理人酬勞揭露方式除現行彙總配合級距揭露人數規定外,同時允許公司可自行選擇採個別揭露或於級距中揭露姓名之方式,以鼓勵公司自願揭露。故有別於過去研究多以經理人管理團隊之薪酬總數為研究對象,本研究將以2007年總經理個人之薪酬為研究對象,詳細比較分析在家族與非家族企業下,總經理薪酬幅度與敏感度之差異性。 實證分析結果,在總經理薪酬幅度方面,僅顯示家族企業之控制股東會運用本身權益,剝削小股東利益以追求家族自身之利益,因而導致家族企業總經理獲得之股票紅利薪酬高於非家族企業;在總經理薪酬敏感度方面,則僅發現當其為家族企業時,總經理股票紅利薪酬與會計績效指標間之關聯性會降低,並且其中以後代家族降低程度較第一代家族高;在其他薪酬或總經理是否兼任方面,則未得到與原假說相符之結果,例如在現金薪酬與總薪酬方面,顯示家族企業會低於非家族企業,與原預期相反,並且在薪酬敏感度方面皆顯示當其為家族企業時,其現金薪酬、總薪酬與會計、市場績效指標間之關聯性並不會降低。
Under the traditional agency, the compensation contract is considered to solve the agency problem. This paper studies whether the compensation contract maintains effectively or not when agency problem changes from the traditional agency problem between ownership and managerial authority to the central agency problem between block shareholders and minority shareholders. Financial Supervisoy Commission, Executive Yuan modified the laws of "Criteria Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies" and "Criteria Governing Information to be Published in Public Offering and Issuance Prospectuses" on 4 January 2007.The new laws encourage companies to disclose the individual level of directors and CEOs compensation or directors' and CEOs' name within the rank of compensation information in annual report in 2007.So,compared with prior papers, this paper studies the difference in level and pay-for-performance sensitivity of individual CEO compensation rather than management team between family and non-family firms in 2007. The study shows the level of CEOs' stock bonus compensation in family firms are more than the ones in non-family firms because the controlling owners in family firms have the ability and incentive expropriate minority shareholders. On the other hand, the relationship between CEOs' stock bonus level and accounting performance become lower when the family number occupies CEO in family firms. In addition, the study also shows the level of CEOs' cash and total compensation in family firms are less than the ones in non-family firms, but it doesn't have dissimilar pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation between family firms and non-family firms.