員工認股選擇權之獎酬意涵

The Implication of Employee Stock Option Compensation

呂明哲(Ming-Che Lu)

《當代會計》 11卷1期 (2010/05) Pp. 25-50

https://doi.org/10.6675/JCA.2010.11.1.02

摘要

本文從股東利益著眼，剖析員工認股權之獎酬意涵，因而推論頻繁的研究發展活動、企業營運之規模與市場績效都是發行員工認股權獎酬時，必要考量之經濟面條件。然而從臺灣企業發行員工認股權行為之實證發現，僅研究發展活動與企業規模兩項因素證實為企業所考量。市場績效與員工認股權獎酬並無顯著正相關，顯示臺灣企業尚無法體認員工認股權獎酬之性質。由於員工認股權被視為裁決性獎酬工具，各企業對員工認股權之發行容易受非經濟面因素影響，形成所謂過度獎酬或獎酬不足情形。本研究針對此種獎酬無效率，以隨機前緣模型進行分析。研究結果顯示，臺灣企業在發行員工認股權獎酬時，部份企業的確存在獎酬無效率之情形，使得其員工認股權發行不足。其中，獎酬無效率與股票紅利獎酬機制呈顯著正相關，部份企業董事會因不熟悉各種獎酬工具之意涵，任由股票紅利之溢酬排擠員工認股權獎酬，實則已傷害到股東之利益。

關鍵字

獎酬 ； 員工認股權 ； 無效率 ； 隨機前緣模型

並列摘要

This paper explores the implication of employee stock option compensation from shareholders' interest and infers that R&D activities, firm size and market performance are major economic determinants when issuing the employee stock option. Empirical results indicate that only R&D activities and firm size are significantly related to employee stock option grants; however, market performance is not. It means that most firms in Taiwan fail to realize fully the nature of employee stock option compensation. Since employee stock option is regarded as discretionary compensation, the non-economic factors may affect the decision about employee stock option grants and result in over-compensation or under-compensation. Such a phenomenon, specified as compensation inefficiency, is evaluated using the stochastic frontier methodology. The results reveal that there significantly exists compensation inefficiency, issuing less employee stock option, in some listed firms in Taiwan. Moreover, the relationship between compensation inefficiency and stock bonus is significantly positive, indicating that the boards of some listed companies misunderstand the implications of various compensation tools. An excess of profit from stock bonus for employees causes under-compensation in employee stock option grants, and the interests of stockholders are harmed.

並列關鍵字

compensation ； employee stock option ； inefficiency ； stochastic frontier model

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