董監薪酬揭露方式對董監事薪酬之影響

本研究目的為探討台灣上市櫃公司董事、監察人薪酬之揭露方式對其薪酬水準之影響。其中，揭露方式分為全面揭露與彙總級距揭露，全面揭露又分為強制全面揭露和自願全面揭露。經兩階段控制內生性影響之結果顯示，相較其他公司，全面揭露與董監薪酬呈顯著負相關，顯示全面揭露對董監薪酬有抑制效果。另外，相較自願全面揭露，強制全面揭露對董監薪酬的抑制效果較強，推論自願全面揭露對董監薪酬具部分補償效果。

關鍵字

董監薪酬揭露；董監酬勞；自願揭露；強制揭露

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of disclosure methods on the compensation level of directors and supervisors in Taiwan listed companies. The ways of the disclosure are comprehensive disclosure and aggregate disclosure. Comprehensive disclosure is divided into mandatory comprehensive disclosure and voluntary comprehensive disclosure to explore the impact of these two ways on amount of their payment. Compared with other companies, the results of two-stage regression to control endogeneity show that comprehensive disclosure has a significant negative correlation with the compensation of directors and supervisors, indicating that comprehensive disclosure has a restraining effect on the remuneration of directors and supervisors. In addition, compared with voluntary comprehensive disclosure, mandatory comprehensive disclosure has a stronger inhibition effect on the remuneration of directors and supervisors. It is inferred that voluntary comprehensive disclosure has a partial compensation effect on the remuneration of directors and supervisors.