影響董監事薪酬的可能因素分析

An Analysis of Possible Factors Affecting the Compensation of Directors and Supervisors

凃家銘(Chia-Ming Tu)

指導教授 ： 倪衍森

淡江大學/商管學院/管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2017.00051

摘要

本研究以2009到2015年台灣上市公司為研究樣本，探討公司治理股權結構變數與財報變數及控制變數，對(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比變化之影響。本研究從實證結果得到以下發現：其一、董監質押股比率、董事規模、董事長兼總經理、負債、電子業DM這些都與(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比呈現正向關係，代表有以上現象的公司，自肥的可能性機率很高。其二董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率、獨立董事人數、總資產週轉率、稅後淨利率、市值這些都與(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比呈現反向關係，代表有以上現象的公司，自肥的可能性機率較低。另外也加入董監事進修時數與出席董監事會平均次數來進一步探討是否有盡其義務來領這份薪資，惟受限於部分公司資料取得不易，故無法顯示其是否有受影響。

關鍵字

薪酬 ； 股權結構 ； 財報變數

並列摘要

This study explores whether remunerations including total remuneration, directors’ remuneration, and top managers’ remuneration would be affected by the variables in terms of corporate governance, financial variables, and other controlling variables over the data period 2009-2015. By employing various remunerations over net income as our diverse remuneration variables, we derive the following finding as shown below. First, directors pledge ratio, board size, CEO duality, debt ratio, electronic dummy would have positive impacts on these remuneration variables. Second, directors’ holding ratio, managers’ holding ratio, independent directors, asset turnover ratio, net profit ratio, and firm scales are negatively related with these remuneration variables. These results revealed that the firms with ill-functioning corporate governance and inferior financial performance are inclined to have higher remunerations, indicating that these firms concerning the interest of directors and top managers instead of the interest of shareholders might not the firms with good corporate governance and superior financial performance.

並列關鍵字

Remunerations ； board structure ； financial statement variables

參考文獻

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