力霸案引發之董監事離職潮與盈餘管理之關聯性研究

The Resignations of Directors and Supervisors and Earnings Management

林昆民(Kun-Min Lin)

指導教授 ： 蔡彥卿

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.00349

摘要

本研究旨在探討市場上爆發重大會計醜聞後，其所引發之上市櫃公司董監事離職潮現象是否能作為公司經營狀況與管理階層道德操守不佳的警訊。本研究樣本分為二組：離職公司與對照公司。前者係指2007年1月4日力霸案爆發後，一個月內有發生董監事離職現象之上市、上櫃或興櫃公司；後者則為與離職公司相同產業之所有其他公司。本研究透過比較離職公司與對照公司的裁決性應計數，以瞭解發生董監離職現象之公司，在2001年至2005年間是否利用較大幅度的盈餘管理，以掩飾公司財務不佳的情形。實證結果發現，離職公司在財務比率上的表現較差，且盈餘管理的情況也較對照公司來得嚴重。故本研究實證結果顯示會計醜聞所引發之董監事離職潮現象，值得作為提前發現潛在地雷股的警訊之一。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 裁決性應計數 ； 力霸集團 ； 董監事離職 ； 會計醜聞

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not the trend of resignations of directors and supervisors can be regarded as a signal of bad financial situation and managerial ethics. Research sample in this study is separated into two groups: resignation companies and comparison companies. The former group contains companies listed at stock exchange market, over-the-counter market or emerging stock market in Taiwan which have at least one director or supervisor decided to resign within one-month period right after the outbreak of accounting scandal of Rebar Group; the latter group consists the rest of companies in the same industries as resignations companies. This study compares the discretionary accruals of resignations companies and comparison companies in order to know whether the managers in resignations companies manipulated earnings to cover their real financial situations up between 2001 and 2005. The empirical results indicate that the financial performance of resignation companies is worse than that of comparison companies in respect to financial ratios. Moreover, the managers of resignation companies utilized larger discretionary accruals in absolute value to manipulate earnings. Therefore, the trend of resignations of directors and supervisors caused by accounting scandals in the marketplace is worthwhile to be viewed as one of early signals of distressed securities.

並列關鍵字

Earnings management ； Discretionary accruals ； Rebar group ； Resignations of directions and supervisors ； Accounting scandals

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