馴服立法巨靈

Taming Legislative Leviathan

林水波(Shoei-Po Lin)

《政策研究學報》 8期 (2008/06) Pp. 1-21

https://doi.org/10.7070/PR.200806.0001

摘要

第七屆的立法院，國、民兩黨的權力結構嚴重失衡，導致往後的議事過程上，極可能逐步出現立法巨靈的現象，進而滋生各項政治威脅，無益台灣的民主鞏固，乃論述六項立法巨靈的指標，提出較令人擔心的政治威脅，引領國會成員的關注，盡可能在議事上展現策略性謙卑，而議決出符應當前時境的議案。
而危及國會形象及民主價值的威脅，可由課責機制的有效填補及適切運用來馴服，達及兩項目標：事先圍堵威脅的出現，事後扭轉帶有政治風險的議案，使其失去執行的空間，進而致使國會搭建邁向理想定位之途，即強化政策回應的機制、尊重多數少數的場域、活化政憲機關的機轉、問責行政部門的對口、解開立法僵局的樞紐、回歸制度邏輯的領航及展現議事效率的場域。

關鍵字

威脅潛存 ； 課責落差 ； 立法巨靈

並列摘要

The new Legislative Yuan is really dominated by a single party. This radical political change may create the phenomenon of legislative leviathan leading to a threat-prone organization and causing six threats some time in the future. This paper is to present indicators of legislative leviathan and warning signs to spur stakeholders in thinking up and designing effective strategies to minimize or contain the threat. Bridging accountability gap is an ideal way to transform a threat-prone congress into a threat-prepared one, thus managing suck threats before they become a reality. This transformation is operated for effectively taming legislative leviathan to reach ideal standard of democratic congress.

並列關鍵字

threat-prone congress ； accountability gap ； legislative leviathan

參考文獻

林水波、邱靖鈜(2006)。公民投票vs.公民會議。台北:五南。

Behn, R.(2001).Rethinking Democratic Accountability.Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institutions Press.

Bertelsman Foundation (ed.)(2002).Transparency: A Basis for Responsibility and Cooperation.Gutersloh:Bertelsman Foundation.

Binder, S. A.(1998).Minority Rights, Majority Rule.Cambridge:Cambridge Univ. Press.

Binder, S. A.(2003).Statemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock.Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press.