由於美國共同基金、我國證券投資信託基金等集合投資計畫(Collective Investment Scheme, CIS),在世界各主要資本市場之持股比例越來越高,所影響之投資人與被投資之公司越來越多,是以國際間興起一研究機構投資人與公司治理關連性之熱潮。然對於機構投資人是否能於公司治理中發揮正面監督力量,各方見解不一。本文認爲關鍵點在於機構投資人本身之治理問題是否獲得妥善控制。本文以研究作爲連結公司治理與機構投資人治理的投信事業行使證券投資信託基金所持股票股東權爲核心,同時參考其他國家與國際組織之相關立法經驗與規定,再配合我國資本市場的實況,對於我國相關法規進行評析與修法建議。本文並認爲,機構投資人參與公司治理或有其優點,但亦非公司治理的萬靈丹,公司治理的最終成效,應爲各種因素交相作用的综合成果,然在相關制度配合下,本文認爲,機構投資人應可爲我國公司治理帶來正面影響。
Most corporate scholars argue that institutional investors play a key role in corporate governance. OECD 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance also emphasize that the duty of institutional investors is to involve the corporate governance with respect to their investments. Meanwhile, CalPERS, as the biggest pension fund in the United States, is regarded as the strongest promoter of corporate governance. However, a few studies indicate that institutional investors in Taiwan go toward different direction. This paper tries to analyze the current issues of institutional investors in corporate governance area. Focusing on the Securities Investment Trust Fund system, this paper first reviews the first level of principle-agency relation: public investors of funds vs. fund managers, and then the second level of principle-agency relation: fund managers vs. the companies they invest (portfolio companies). The governance mechanism under the fund will be reviewed; the incentive, pressure and their legal duty of fund managers and the depositary to fulfill their fiduciary duty will be examined. In conclusion, this paper submits suggestions to perfect the current system, aiming to encouraging institutional investors to take a more positive role in corporate governance by introducing the mandatory disclosure rule of the Securities Investment Trust Fund voting of portfolio shares.