Bargaining over Managerial Delegation and Strategic Import Tariffs

管理授權議價模型與策略性進口關稅

翁朝棟 ； 趙偉 ； 陳家榮

《亞太經濟管理評論》 11卷1期 (2007/09) Pp. 153-160

https://doi.org/10.30087/APEMR.200709.0007

摘要

本文主要是在評估一般化Nash議價模型對策略性進口政策訂定之影響。在銷售額授權之談判架構下，它分析策略性進口關稅與議價過程之交互影響。我們證明(1)當本國對外國廠商課徵從量關稅時，會導致外國廠商之邊際成本上升；此外，也發現了(2)當管理者的議價能力相對提高時將會導致最適關稅稅率的下降。

關鍵字

銷售額授權 ； 議價 ； 進口關稅

並列摘要

This paper assesses the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic import policies. In particular, it analyzes how the strategic import-tariff policy and the bargaining process affect reciprocally within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation model. We show that when a specific tariff imposed by the home country on the foreign firm, the marginal cost faced by the foreign firm is raised. In addition, we find that an increase in the managers' bargaining power leads to a decrease in the optimal tariff rate.

並列關鍵字

Sales Delegation ； Bargaining ； Import Tariff

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