Oligopoly with Consumer-friendly Firm in an Endogenous Timing Framework

內生時間架構下關心消費者廠商的寡佔市場分析

王鳳生 ； 翁詩雅

《亞太經濟管理評論》 16卷2期 (2013/03) Pp. 85-92

摘要

本論文建構一個寡占產業模型，有m＋1家的廠商，其中m家是利潤極大化廠商外，另有一家關懷消費者的廠商。我們在內生時間架構下分別分析Stackelberg與Cournot競爭，証明當關懷消費者的廠商是市場領導者時，相較於其他兩種情況，因其社會福利最高是優勢策略，此外，証明關懷消費者的廠商有先動優勢，而利潤極大化廠商則無此優勢。

關鍵字

消費者關懷 ； 內生時間 ； 社會福利

並列摘要

In this paper we consider an oligopolistic industry with m+1 firms in which there are m profit-maximizing firms and one consumer-friendly firm. We analyze Stackelberg competition and Cournot competition in an endogenous-timing framework, and show that the social welfare with consumer-friendly firm as a leader is the highest relative to the other two cases. We also show that the consumer friendly firm exhibits the first-mover advantage whereas the pure profit-maximizing firms do not have such an advantage.

並列關鍵字

Consumer-friendly Initiative ； Endogenous Timing ； Social Welfare

參考文獻

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