一個沒有固定方法的方法論：論“典範知識”的“相對主義式誤解”

本文剖析各種應用孔恩之《科學革命的結構》理念所引發的問題，然後針對這些問題，提出嘗試的解答。本文認為，該應用所出現的問題，主要在於將「科學社群」這個概念，視作「科學定義」。如此一來，往往容易使得孔恩在《結構》中所昭示的哲學思想，成為以「科學社群」為主的「相對主義」。孔恩曾經不斷地嘗試，說明他不贊同「相對主義」的立場，但成效不彰。我們在本文中，假設孔恩未能明示地釐清其「立場」的原因，正好就是他不斷致力於強調的部分，也就是在科學實作中不能形式化的部分。我們認為，這種重視「實作成分」的哲學，不但是孔恩哲學「創新」的部分，也是他長期招致誤解的主因，尤其是對那些期待客觀與普遍解釋的人而言。因此，在這些期待中，縱使孔恩在《結構》後，提出新的觀點（即「價值」），但是這個觀點依然包含許多不受「客觀主義」與「普遍主義」接納的概念，例如「團體決策」、「主觀因素」以及「客觀價值」等。然而，在孔恩哲學的「創新」之中，這些概念都是用來說明科學發展的核心，緊緊扣著科學實際的活動。

關鍵字

孔恩；科學革命的結構；相對主義；理論轉換；價值

並列摘要

This paper intends to analyze problems derived from applying T. Kuhn's ideas developed since the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Then, we will try to offer an explanation explicating how these problems could have taken place. With regard to the concerned problems, the paper deems evident that they mainly originate from many people's identification between the idea of scientific community with the definition of science. This identification consequently causes an accusation of relativism established erroneously on the basis of scientific community. Though Kuhn ceaselessly denied the accusation, but his efforts fell in vain. In this paper, we intend to put forward a hypothesis, depicting that the reasons why Kuhn failed to clarify his positions were precisely the parts he constantly stressed throughout his life, namely, the practical parts of science. We intend therefore to reiterate that they are innovative as well as reasons of the misunderstandings of Kuhn's philosophy. The reasons are especially clear for those who anticipate ”objective” and ”universal” solutions and thus fail to appreciate Kuhn's innovative expositions. Kuhn attempted to propose other ideas (such as that of values) in order to repudiate the allegations, explaining the procedure of theory change as well as theory choice. However, as these ideas still contain subjective conceptions (such as ”group value”, ”subjective elements”, ”objective values”, etc), they remain to be unacceptable for objectivists.