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德沃金機運平等觀:女性主義批評

Dworkin's Luck Egalitarianism: Feminist's Critiques

摘要


本文從女性主義立場來檢討德沃金(Ronald Dworkin)的平等理論,包括免於嫉妒的資源平等、運氣/選擇區分,以及自由平等理論。此文將綜合彙整女性主義學者的相關批評,包括E. Anderson (1999; 2008)、Eva Kittay (1999)、Iris Young (2001)、Anne Phillips (2004)、Ingrid Robeyns (2003a; 2003b)、Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2006),從依靠批判、性別化的社會結構與能力平等三方面來檢討德沃金的自由平等理論。 本文的核心論旨是:即使是理論背景殊異,自由主義女性主義如Nussbaum、社會主義女性主義如Young和Phillips、民主平等主義如Anderson,以及關懷倫理學者如Kittay、Robeyns,其實存在著深層的基本共識,亦即:利他的人類(不對等)互助是社會繁榮幸福的基石。於是,從看似各自為政與不相為謀的眾家女性主義對於德沃金平等理論的批評中,其實已經浮現可以抗衡於德沃金自由平等理論的系統化理論,從而指向了完全不同於德沃金的另類自由平等論。

並列摘要


Feminists from different disciplines, those discussed in this paper are E. Anderson (1999; 2008), Eva Kittay (1999), Iris Young (2001), Anne Phillips (2004), Ingrid Robeyns (2003a; 2003b), Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2006), have been criticizing R. Dworkin's egalitarian theory, particularly on his concepts of envy-free equal resources, luck/choice distinction and liberal egalitarianism. Feminists' critiques can be generally classified in three directions, they are, dependence critique, social division of sexual labor and capability approach. This paper not only aims at following closely what has been so wrong about Dworkin's egalitarian theory from feminists' perspectives, but also aims at arguing that, despite the apparent differences among feminists, there is an alternative theory of liberal egalitarianism emerged out of these feminists' critiques. The paper would conclude by presenting three characteristics of the alternative theory greatly inspired by feminists' critiques, which all are in great contrast to Dworkin's theory of justice. First, the alternative liberal egalitarian theory would replace envy-free equality with altruistic care and social corporation as the ground of theory of justice. Second, it would re-interpret what Dwokin means by sovereign virtue not in terms of how government should avoid envies among social members, but in terms of how government should provide the basic care for the protection of human dignity. Third, as far as human dignity is concerned, capability approach is better than resource equality as just distribution of social resources.

參考文獻


吳秀瑾(2005)。依靠與平等:論Kittay愛的勞動。女學學誌。19,157-183。
吳秀瑾(2006)。關懷倫理的道德蘊涵:試論女性主義的道德知識生產與實踐。政大哲學學報。16,107-162。
Anderson, Elizabeth S.(1999).What is the Point of Equality?.Ethics.109(2),287-337.
Anderson, Elizabeth S.(2008).How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?.Theoretical Inquiries in Law.9(1),239-270.
Armstrong, C.(2005).Equality, Risk and Responsibility: Dworkin on the Insurance Market.Economy and Society.34(3),451-473.

被引用紀錄


陳閔翔(2014)。作為平等的正義:德沃金平等自由主義的理路與辯護政治與社會哲學評論(51),93-138。https://doi.org/10.6523/168451532014120051003
鄭焙隆(2010)。運氣與社會公正:檢視運氣平等主義〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00037
陳閔翔(2010)。論Ronald Dworkin法政哲學中的民主觀:建構、爭議與批判〔博士論文,國立臺灣師範大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0021-1610201315201831

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