本文以德沃金晚近的法哲學理論為研究對象,嘗試對其理論的道德基礎,即從合法性、平等到人性尊嚴三個政治道德價值,進行分析考察與檢討反省。第二節介紹德沃金近來對法律的概念提出的類型區分,分析合法性價值作為法律之重要政治道德價值的理論意涵;第三節考察德沃金合法性價值觀的實質內涵,即整全性(integrity)與平等(equality)的政治道德價值;第四節進一步探討,德沃金以合法性、整全性及平等作為其法哲學理論的道德基礎,實際上是立基於一個更根本、但也饒富爭議的論述上,亦即他對於「人性尊嚴原則」的論述;第五節審視人性尊嚴原則在德沃金法哲學理論的關鍵地位,並檢討該論述所衍生出來的關於人是否有內在客觀價值的哲學爭議,同時提出一些初步的檢討與省思;最後,第六節除簡要總結本文論點外,也將概述德沃金對法律與道德之關係的最終看法。
This essay attempts to explore and reflect the moral foundation of Ronald Dworkin's legal philosophy, that is, the political moral values from legality, equality to human dignity. Part 2 will introduce Dworkin's recent argument about different concepts of law and analyze the theoretical implication that treats legality as an important political moral value of law. Part 3 examines the substantive content of legality, i.e., the political moralities of integrity and equality. Part 4 argues that, the moral foundation of Dworkin's legal philosophy not only lies in the values of legality, integrity, and equality, it is also grounded on a more fundamental but controversial argument, namely, the argument about the principles of human dignity. Accordingly, Part 5 will further investigate the philosophical debate derived from the argument of human dignity. It is the debate about whether each person has an intrinsic value of life. Finally, Part 6 will briefly summarize the points of this essay and generally sketch Dworkin's concluding claim about the relation of law and morality.