以賽局理論解析釣魚臺主權衝突事件

An Analysis of Diaoyutai Islands's Conflicts: Game Theory Approach

吳正光(Cheng-Kuang Wu)

《國防雜誌》 28卷2期 (2013/03) Pp. 37-48

https://doi.org/10.6326/NDJ.2013.28(2).3

摘要

近年來釣魚臺列嶼的主權爭議使我國、日本及中共之間紛爭頻繁。本文應用賽局理論解析我國與日本間宣示主權的策略互動關係，分析均衡顯示我國與日本的競爭情況是一場先行者優勢賽局。中共與日本的競爭較為激烈，中共會施以懲罰性手段，雙方會進入重複性囚犯困境賽局，初期陷入互相挑釁的困境，但長期會走向合作結果。我國主動提出東海和平倡議，希望以和平與合作的方式，共同開發東海資源，面對中共與日本未來走向合作的結果，我國相關單位必須掌握釣魚臺情勢，強化兩岸協商，嚴防中共與日本乘機矮化我國。

關鍵字

釣魚臺衝突 ； 鷹鴿賽局 ； 納許均衡 ； 重複囚犯困境賽局

並列摘要

Recently, the sovereignty of Diaoyutai islands has happened serious disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan. This paper intends to study and analyze the disputes concerning Diaoyutai islands from the viewpoint of game theory. Two game theory modelsare applied for analysis of their strategies. Firstly, the interactive behaviours between Taiwan and Japan are modeled as a Hawk-Dove game, after which the first-move advantage is derived from the Nash Equilibrium. Secondly, the conflicts between China and Japan are modeled as a repeated game. They both face prisoner's dilemma in a short-term relationship. Because China will punish Japan, the mutually beneficial outcome can be achieved in a long-term relationship. China and Japan will cooperate to manage the resources of Diaoyutai islands in the future. Taiwan proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative which hopes all sides involved can work together in reducing discord and leading three countries on the path of peace and cooperation. The study concludes and suggests Taiwan should not cooperate only through concessions, but also should be based on the protection of inherent rights through dialogues, knowledge and law.

並列關鍵字

Diaoyutai Islands Conflicts ； Hawk-Dove Game ； Nash Equilibrium ； Repeated Dilemma Game