政府委託研究案愈來愈多,但是也引發不同的問題,其中代理問題是大家較為關注的議題;以往探討政府業務委外的代理問題有幾項缺失,例如後設、靜態、欠缺對於重複賽局的考量。本研究特別提出整合賽局理論與代理人理論的研究取向,並利用文獻蒐集、內容分析與個案研究方法,探討高雄市溫室氣體減量策略計畫委託研究案的代理問題。本研究一方面從文獻整理提出代理問題的三大類型與七大代理問題,另一方面利用賽局理論探討政府委託研究案(賽局)的參與者、規則、策略與報酬。研究結果顯示,結合賽局理論的研究取向,對於代理問題的產生有較好的解釋力,也揭示委託人與代理人基於理性的策略互動是代理問題產生的主要原因之一。最後,本研究結果對於未來如何降低政府委託研究案的代理問題也有具體的建議與對策。
There has been more government commissioned studies causing a variety of problems. Agency problems are one of the problems that attract most attention. There are some shortcomings for previous studies that focused on the agency problems of government commissioned studies, such as meta- and static approach, and the lack of repeated games. Therefore, this study proposes an approach to integrating Game Theory and Agency Theory, and then uses literature review, content analysis and case study to explore the agency problems of the commissioned study of the Kaohsiung City GHG Strategy Program. On one hand, this study proposes three types of agency problems and seven agency problems; on the other hand, this study integrates Game Theory to explore the participants, rules, strategies, and payoffs of government commissioned studies. The research results show that the research approach of integrating Game theory presenting players' strategy interdependence is one of the most important causes for agency problems. The results also show that not only the integration of Game Theory can describe the agency problems better, but also addresses the strategies and actions that few studies ever addressed. Lastly, this study also proposes concrete suggestions and solutions to the agency problems of government commissioned studies