由股東行動主義探討公司法第一七三條之一的「股東會召集權」

股東行動主義的目的是積極地創造有利於股東參與公司事務的法制環境、建構完善的法律制度，讓股東可以透過股東會行使其股東權，發揮對公司的影響力以維護自身的權益。其發展背景與適用的法制環境與最新的演進趨勢「新資本金融主義」並無法直接適用於臺灣法制上。2018年公司法新增訂第一七三條之一，讓持有股份總數超過半數且持有超過三個月的股東可以自行召集臨時股東會，自有其背景可考，本文亦認為本條有增訂的必要性存在，因此藉由比較法例的方式探尋出美國法與日本法關於股東會召集權與召集請求權的相關規定，發現公司法第一七三條之一的股東會召集權規定雖不是唯一、特例的立法，但持股比例上確實有其特殊性存在，因此本文認為公司法第一七三條之一是具有臺灣特色的股東行動主義。

關鍵字

股東行動主義；門口野蠻人；門口狼群；新資本金融主義；避險基金；公司法第一七三條之一；臨時股東會

並列摘要

The purpose of shareholder activism is to actively create a legal environment conducive to shareholders' participation in corporate affairs and to establish a well-established legal system. Accordingly, such system allows shareholders to exercise their shareholder rights to protect their interest and maintain their influence through the shareholders' meeting. However, its background and applicable legal environment as well as the latest evolutionary trend of the ＂New Financial Capitalism＂ cannot be directly applied to Taiwan's legal system. In 2018, the Company Act added a new Article 173-1 which states that shareholders who hold more than half of the total number of shares and have held for more than three months are allowed to convene the provisional shareholders' meeting. This paper argues that this new provision has its traceable background which needs an update. Therefore, by comparing the relevant provisions in the US law and the Japanese law on the convening power and the convening power of the shareholders' meeting, this paper contends that although the new convening power of the shareholders' meeting of Article 173-1 of the Company Act is not a special and unique legislation, the proportion of shares has its distinctiveness. Hence, this paper asserts that the Article 173-1 of the Company Act is a shareholder activism with Taiwanese characteristics.

並列關鍵字

Shareholder Activism ； Barbarians at the Gate ； the Wolf at the Door ； New Finance Capitalism ； the Hedge Fund ； Article 173-1 of the Company Act ； Provisional Shareholder's Meeting